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Legal Ethics
by Patrick Emery Longan *
I. INTRODUCTION
This Survey covers the period from June 1, 2019, to May 31, 2020. 1
The Article discusses developments with respect to attorney discipline,
ineffective assistance of counsel, bar admission, disqualification of
counsel, judicial conduct, malpractice and other civil claims, contempt,
several miscellaneous cases, formal advisory opinions (State Bar of
Georgia and the American Bar Association), and amendments to the
Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.
II. LAWYER DISCIPLINE
A.

Disbarments 2

1.
Trust Account and Other Financial Issues
The Georgia Supreme Court disbarred six attorneys during the
Survey period for misconduct that primarily related to their trust
accounts or other financial issues.
Two of the cases involved voluntary surrenders of the lawyers’
licenses. The supreme court accepted the voluntary surrender of
Matthew A. Dickason’s license in response to numerous grievances
relating to his failure to account for funds that he received as a fiduciary
in connection with real estate closings. 3 Sarah M. Wayman voluntarily
surrendered her license after admitting that, although she received
* William Augustus Bootle Chair in Ethics and Professionalism in the Practice of Law.
Washington University (A.B., 1979); University of Sussex (M.A., 1980); University of
Chicago (J.D., 1983). Member, State Bars of Georgia and Texas.
1 For an analysis of Georgia legal ethics during the June 1, 2018 to May 31, 2019 survey
period, see Patrick Emery Longan, Legal Ethics, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 71 MERCER
L. REV. 157 (2019).
2 Lawyers in Georgia can submit petitions for voluntary discipline. GA. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 4-227 (2020). The acceptance of a petition for voluntary discipline of
disbarment (sometimes described as a voluntary surrender of the lawyer’s license) is
tantamount to disbarment by the court and is treated as such in this Article.
3 In re Dickason, 308 Ga. 411, 841 S.E.2d 728, 729 (2020).
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$75,000 in funds that should have been distributed to her client and
certain third parties, she did not distribute those funds to the appropriate
parties and could account for only $5,000 of the funds. 4
The supreme court disbarred Andrew D. Taylor as a matter of
reciprocal discipline after he was disbarred in Nevada. 5 Mr. Taylor lost
his Nevada license because he misappropriated more than one million
dollars of client funds, commingled client funds with his, and opened
numerous law firms and trust accounts in an attempt to mislead the bar.
Mr. Taylor had also entered into litigation-advance loan agreements on
behalf of clients without their knowledge, used the proceeds for his own
expenses, failed to repay the loans, failed to cooperate with the
disciplinary authorities, and made false statements during the
disciplinary process. 6
Carla Burton Gaines was disbarred after she failed to distribute over
$337,000 she held in trust and instead commingled the funds with her
own and converted them to her own use. 7 Ms. Gaines falsely told the
company that was to receive the funds that she had wired them, and the
company sued her and obtained a default judgment against her. In a postjudgment deposition, Ms. Gaines testified falsely that she had
transferred $280,000 of the funds to a third-party in error, and thereafter
she failed to respond to discovery requests, even when she was ordered
to do so. The court held her in contempt, and Ms. Gaines told the court
that she would comply with the court’s orders. When she did not, the trial
court ordered her to be incarcerated until she complied. Ms. Gaines did
not respond to the State Bar’s complaint and was held in default. 8 In
aggravation, the special master found that Ms. Gaines had a prior
disciplinary history, had a dishonest or selfish motive, committed
multiple offenses, engaged in bad-faith obstruction of the disciplinary
process, had substantial experience in the practice of law, and was
indifferent to making restitution. 9
The supreme court disbarred Alexander E. Kahn for violating
multiple Rules of conduct in connection with his representation of one
client. 10 Mr. Kahn defaulted in the disciplinary process and therefore
admitted that he induced the client to invest $300,000 in an LLC that
Mr. Kahn had formed, and that in connection with that investment Mr.

In re Wayman, 307 Ga. 586, 586–87, 837 S.E.2d 261 (2019).
In re Taylor, 308 Ga. 490, 841 S.E.2d 661 (2020).
6 Id. at 491, 841 S.E.2d 661 (2020).
7 In re Gaines, 307 Ga. 459, 836 S.E.2d 82, 83 (2019).
8 Id. at 459–60, 836 S.E.2d at 83.
9 Id. at 460, 836 S.E.2d at 84.
10 In re Kahn, 306 Ga. 189, 829 S.E.2d 344 (2019).
4
5
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Kahn failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 1.8(a) 11 (business
transactions with clients). Mr. Kahn did not provide documentation of
the client’s supposed investment in the LLC and did not upon request
return the client’s money. Mr. Kahn also failed: (1) to provide the client
with copies of tax returns that he supposedly was preparing; (2) to
provide documentation about his representation of the client with respect
to a tax penalty that had been assessed; (3) to file a tax return that he
had prepared and the client had signed; and (4) to prepare a will that he
promised to prepare for the client. 12
The supreme court disbarred Clarence A. Sydnor, IV after he settled
a client’s claim, forged the client’s name on the insurance company’s
check, deposited the money into his operating account, failed to inform
the client about the funds, and failed to deliver the money to the client. 13
Mr. Sydnor failed to respond to numerous inquiries from the client about
the status of the settlement. 14 The supreme court noted that Mr. Sydnor
acted with a dishonest or selfish motive. 15
2.
Client Abandonment and Lack of Communication
The supreme court disbarred eight attorneys for misconduct that
included client abandonment and failure to communicate.
The supreme court disbarred Christopher John Thompson because he
abandoned a client and did not respond to the state bar’s formal
complaint. 16 Mr. Thompson had been hired to represent a client in a
personal injury case and, although he filed the complaint, he thereafter
took no action in the matter. The case was eventually dismissed. 17 The
supreme court noted the absence of mitigating circumstances and
disbarred Mr. Thompson. 18
The supreme court disbarred Johnnie Mae Graham. 19 Ms. Graham
defaulted and thereby admitted that she had undertaken to represent a
client in a claim related to a car accident but (after filing the complaint)
abandoned the matter, failed to communicate with the client, did not
return the client’s file, and did not respond to the state bar’s requests for
information regarding the matter. The client’s case was dismissed
because Ms. Graham did not appear at a hearing. The court found that
GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a) (2020).
Id. at 189–90, 829 S.E.2d at 345.
13 In re Sydnor, 306 Ga. 383, 830 S.E.2d 732, 733 (2019).
14 Id. at 384, 830 S.E.2d at 733.
15 Id., 830 S.E.2d at 734.
16 In re Thompson, 306 Ga. 618, 832 S.E.2d 334 (2019).
17 Id. at 618, 832 S.E.2d at 334.
18 Id. at 619, 832 S.E.2d at 335.
19 In re Graham, 306 Ga. 380, 829 S.E.2d 67, 68 (2019).
11
12
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there were two aggravating factors, substantial experience in the
practice of law and previous disciplinary history. 20
The supreme court disbarred Lesley Annis, 21 who accepted fees to
represent two clients in bankruptcy matters but then abandoned the
clients and stopped communicating with them. 22 Ms. Annis defaulted in
the disciplinary process. 23
Jeffrey L. Sakas was disbarred 24 after he defaulted in connection with
three formal complaints that raised six different disciplinary matters.
Mr. Sakas had been disciplined twice before in recent years, once by
public reprimand and once by suspension. Many of the new matters
involved Mr. Sakas representing clients while he was under that
suspension. In two other matters, Mr. Sakas did not do the agreed-upon
work, did not respond to the clients’ inquiries, and refused to return the
clients’ retainers. 25 In another matter, Mr. Sakas followed the same
pattern and ended up in fee arbitration with his former clients, where he
initially made numerous false statements about the work he allegedly
performed. 26 Mr. Sakas agreed to represent another client who was being
evicted by the client’s mortgage lender. Mr. Sakas filed an appeal of the
eviction order but, after Mr. Sakas did not respond to a dispositive motion
filed by the lender, the court granted summary judgment to the lender
and issued a writ of possession. Mr. Sakas also had advised his client not
to comply with the court’s order to make the client’s mortgage payments
to the court registry. Mr. Sakas made another attempt, in a separate suit,
to stop the eviction, but again he failed to respond to a motion to dismiss,
and the case was dismissed. Mr. Sakas then refused to return the client’s
file. 27
The special master found numerous grounds for finding that the
presumptive sanction under the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions was disbarment. The special master found no mitigating
circumstances and found in aggravation that Mr. Sakas acted with a
dishonest or selfish motive, engaged in a pattern of misconduct,
committed numerous violations of the Rules, showed bad faith
obstruction of the disciplinary process, refused to acknowledge the
wrongful nature of his conduct, and had substantial experience in the

Id. at 380, 829 S.E.2d at 68.
re Annis, 306 Ga. 187, 188, 829 S.E.2d 346, 348 (2019).
22 Id. at 187–88, 829 S.E.2d at 347–48.
23 Id. at 187, 829 S.E.2d at 347.
24 In re Sakas, 306 Ga. 504, 507, 831 S.E.2d 734, 736 (2019).
25 Id. at 504–05, 831 S.E.2d at 735.
26 Id. at 504–05, 831 S.E.2d at 735.
27 Id. at 506, 831 S.E.2d at 735–36.
20

21In
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practice of law. 28 The supreme court accepted the special master’s
recommendation to disbar Mr. Sakas. 29
An attorney accepted a retainer in excess of $29,000 to handle a
divorce case. The monthly invoices sent by the attorney totaled $12,866
as of September 2014. When the case was resolved approximately a year
later, the parties agreed to have the trial court decide the issue of
attorney’s fees. However, the lawyer did not file a fee petition, respond to
the spouse’s fee petition, attend the hearing on fees, respond to numerous
requests for information from her client, or refund the difference between
her earned fees and the retainer. The lawyer moved to Maine without
leaving any forwarding information and failed to respond to the state
bar’s notice of discipline. 30 Finding violations of Rules 1.2(a), 31 1.3, 32
1.4, 33 1.5, 34 1.15(I), 35 1.15(II), 36 1.16(d), 37 and 3.2, 38 the supreme court
disbarred her. 39 The court noted as aggravating factors that the lawyer
committed multiple offenses, had a dishonest or selfish motive, had
substantial experience in the practice of law, and showed indifference to
making restitution. 40
The supreme court disbarred Julianne W. Holliday after she
defaulted with respect to three grievances. 41 In the first, she represented
a client with respect to several traffic matters but failed to make a timely
filing to prevent the suspension of the client’s license and then falsely
told the client that she had done so. After his license was suspended, the
client attempted unsuccessfully and repeatedly to reach Ms. Holliday
until she sent him an incorrect message on social media that he could get
his license back by attending DUI school. The client fired Ms. Holliday,
but she did not return his fee despite promising to do so. There was also
evidence that during this time Ms. Holliday was not authorized to
represent private clients, because she was serving as a public defender. 42

Id. at 506–07, 831 S.E.2d at 736.
Id. at 507, 831 S.E.2d at 736.
30 In re Noriega-Allen, 308 Ga. 398, 398, 841 S.E.2d 1, 1.
31 GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2020).
32 GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2020).
33 GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2020).
34 GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2020).
35 GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(I) (2020).
36 GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15 (II) (2020).
37 GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (d) (2020).
38 GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.2 (2020).
39 Noriega-Allen, 308 Ga. at 398–99, 841 S.E.2d at 1.
40 Id. at 399, 841 S.E.2d at 1-2.
41 In re Holliday, 308 Ga. 216, 216, 839 S.E.2d 518, 520 (2020).
42 Id. at 216–17, 839 S.E.2d at 520.
28
29
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In the second matter, Ms. Holliday agreed to file a habeas corpus
petition for a client. When she had failed to do so as a deadline
approached, the client was forced to file the petition pro se. Ms. Holliday
thereafter could not be reached and did not communicate further with
the client or the client’s family. 43
In the third matter, Ms. Holliday represented a client in a divorce
action and failed to include in the proposed divorce decree modifications
relating to a quitclaim deed as requested by her client. Initially, after
falsely telling the client that she did not know what had happened, Ms.
Holliday agreed to correct her error but never did so. She ignored the
client’s efforts to communicate with her for three months and then, in
response to a request from the client for a refund, paid back only a portion
of the money on the pretense that the rest would cover additional work,
which was never done. Ms. Holliday refunded the rest of the fee only upon
submission of the grievance but failed to return the client’s file and
relocated her office without notifying the client. 44
On the basis of these three grievances, and in light of the aggravating
factors of Ms. Holliday’s default, her substantial experience in the
practice of law, her dishonesty, and her abandonment of clients, the
supreme court disbarred her. 45
The supreme court disbarred Scott D. Bennett after he filed an
insufficient response to a notice of discipline and thereby defaulted in
connection with a grievance filed against him. 46 By defaulting, Mr.
Bennett admitted that he represented a client in a dispute that the
parties settled for payment by Mr. Bennett’s client of $8,000. The client
sent Mr. Bennett the money to be disbursed to the other party upon
execution of the settlement documents. Mr. Bennett then abandoned the
matter. He did not respond to opposing counsel or his client, and he did
not send the $8,000 payment. The opposing party filed a motion to
enforce the settlement, and Mr. Bennett did not attend the hearing.
When the court contacted him, Mr. Bennett said the client did not oppose
the order, and the trial court ordered Mr. Bennett’s client to pay the
$8,000 plus $2,500 in attorney’s fees. Mr. Bennett did not inform his
client of the order, with the result that the court entered judgment
against the client for $10,500. Mr. Bennett did not inform the client or
respond to the client’s inquiries, and Mr. Bennet did not return the
$8,000. 47 The supreme court disbarred Mr. Bennett, noting in
aggravation that he had a dishonest or selfish motive, that he did not
Id. at 217, 839 S.E.2d at 520.
Id. at 217–18, 839 S.E.2d at 520–21.
45 Id. at 218, 839 S.E.2d at 521.
46 In re Bennett, 307 Ga. 679, 837 S.E.2d 298 (2019).
47 Id. at 679, 837 S.E.2d at 299.
43
44
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respond properly to the notice of discipline, and that he had substantial
experience in the practice of law. 48
Jared Michael Arrington was disbarred after he failed to use $972.50
in funds he collected as part of the closing of a residential real estate
transaction to purchase a title insurance policy. 49 Mr. Arrington failed to
respond to requests by the lender for information about the policy over a
two-year period, after which the lender filed a grievance. Mr. Arrington
responded that due to personal issues he had closed his practice and that
he thought that his assistant had taken care of all outstanding issues
regarding title policies. He discovered that this was not the case and
promised to send the policy and proof of payment, but he never did so. 50
The supreme court found that this conduct constituted violations of Rule
1.3, 1.4, and 1.15. 51 In aggravation, the State Bar noted that Mr.
Arrington had acted willfully, dishonestly and with a selfish motive and
that he had substantial experience in the practice of law, was indifferent
to making restitution, engaged in multiple violations of the Rules, had
taken advantage of a vulnerable victim, and intentionally failed to
comply with the disciplinary process. 52
3.
Criminal Activity
Three Georgia lawyers lost their licenses during the Survey period as
a result of criminal conduct.
Marc Celello voluntarily surrendered his license to practice law after
pleading guilty in federal court to conspiracy to commit securities
fraud. 53 Richard P. Colbert voluntarily surrendered his license after he
pled guilty in federal court in Florida to thirteen felony charges. 54
Natasha Simone White did the same after pleading guilty in federal court
to the felony of corruptly obstructing a civil forfeiture case. 55
4.
Miscellaneous Disbarments
The supreme court disbarred five lawyers for misconduct that cannot
easily be classified into the usual categories of financial impropriety,
client abandonment, and criminal conduct.
Charles Edward Taylor defaulted in connection with a formal
complaint by the State Bar, and as a result he admitted to numerous
Id. at 680, 837 S.E.2d at 299.
In re Arrington, 308 Ga. 486, 488, 841 S.E.2d 663, 665 (2020).
50 Id. at 487, 841 S.E.2d at 665.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 In re Celello, 308 Ga. 339, 840 S.E.2d 349 (2020).
54 In re Colbert, 307 Ga. 675, 837 S.E.2d 761 (2020).
55 In re White, 307 Ga. 461, 836 S.E.2d 82 (2019).
48
49
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violations of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. 56 Mr. Taylor
cooperated with a non-lawyer who set up an entity named C. Taylor Law
Firm, LLC to advertise and provide “mortgage loan modification
services.” 57 This entity was separate from Mr. Taylor’s regular law
practice, and Mr. Taylor did not supervise the activities of his non-lawyer
associate and allowed payments to the LLC to go directly to the associate
rather than to a trust account. 58
Mr. Taylor accepted referrals from the non-lawyer associate. 59 In two
cases, Mr. Taylor obtained payments from clients, ostensibly for the filing
fees for bankruptcy cases that would at least delay foreclosure on their
homes. 60 Mr. Taylor filed “skeletal” bankruptcy petitions for both clients
but kept some of the funds for the filing fee for himself as compensation
and then falsely represented to the bankruptcy court that he had received
no compensation from the clients (he did this twice in one client’s case).
As a result of the failure to pay the entire filing fee, the bankruptcy cases
for both clients were dismissed. 61 In one of the cases, Mr. Taylor filed a
second bankruptcy petition but, because the entire filing fee had not been
paid, the client’s home was sold in foreclosure. Mr. Taylor eventually
stopped communicating with the client about why the filing fee had not
been paid with the funds supplied by the client. 62 In the other case, Mr.
Taylor failed to appear at a meeting of creditors. After the case was
dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee, the client hired new counsel
and obtained a fee arbitration award against Mr. Taylor. 63
Mr. Taylor violated at least eight different Rules, for several of which
the maximum penalty is disbarment. The only mitigating factor was his
lack of a prior disciplinary history, but there were numerous aggravating
factors, including a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct,
multiple violations of the Rules, failure to cooperate in the disciplinary
process, substantial experience in the practice of law, and indifference to
making restitution. 64 The supreme court accepted the special master’s
recommendation and disbarred Mr. Taylor. 65

In re Taylor, 306 Ga. 622, 832 S.E.2d 328, 329 (2019).
Id. at 622–23, 832 S.E.2d at 329.
58 Id. at 623, 832 S.E.2d at 329–30.
59 Id., 832 S.E.2d at 330.
60 Id. at 623–24, 832 S.E.2d at 330–31.
61 Id. at 623–25, 832 S.E.2d at 330–31.
62 Id. at 624, 832 S.E.2d at 330.
63 Id. at 625, 832 S.E.2d at 331.
64 Id. at 625–26, 832 S.E.2d at 331.
65 Id. at 626, 832 S.E.2d at 331–32.
56
57
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The supreme court disbarred Sherri Jefferson. 66 The formal
complaint against Ms. Jefferson alleged that she violated Rules 3.3, 67
4.2, 68 8.1, 69 and 8.4, 70 and when Ms. Jefferson did not submit timely
responses in discovery, the special master held a hearing on the State
Bar’s motion for sanctions. 71 Ms. Jefferson invoked the Fifth
Amendment 72 when she appeared at the hearing. The special master
struck her answer and deemed the allegations of the complaint to be
admitted. 73 The special master found that the presumptive sanction was
disbarment and noted the following aggravating factors in aggravation
and mitigation:
The special master also found the following aggravating factors,
including: the existence of prior discipline, specifically, Jefferson’s
receipt of an Investigative Panel Reprimand in two cases in 2006; a
selfish and dishonest motive, as Jefferson made misrepresentations to
multiple tribunals with the intent to deceive and communicated with
the other woman with the intent to intimidate her and otherwise affect
the outcome of the relevant proceedings; a pattern of misconduct and
the existence of multiple violations; bad faith obstruction of, and the
submission of false statements in, the disciplinary proceedings; and
the refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct. The
only factor in mitigation recognized by the special master was the
remoteness in time of Jefferson’s prior disciplinary violations, and the
special master excluded those prior violations from consideration in
recommending sanctions. 74

The special master recommended disbarment, and the review board
approved. 75 The supreme court rejected Ms. Jefferson’s claim that she
was entitled to a jury trial and agreed that disbarment was the
appropriate sanction. 76
Melvin T. Johnson failed to respond to discovery requests in
connection with five disciplinary matters. Without a hearing, the special
master found that he had intentionally or consciously failed to respond
66 In re Jefferson, 307 Ga. 50, 56, 834 S.E.2d 73, 77 (2019). The Author served as special
master in this case.
67 GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2020).
68 GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2020).
69 GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.1 (2020).
70 GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2020).
71 Jefferson, 307 Ga. at 51, 834 S.E.2d at 74.
72 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
73 Jefferson, 307 Ga. at 51, 834 S.E.2d at 74.
74 Id. at 53, 834 S.E.2d at 75.
75 Id. at 55, 834 S.E.2d at 77.
76 Id. at 54, 834 S.E.2d at 76.
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to discovery and on that basis struck his pleadings and entered defaults
against him. 77 The supreme court held that there was no abuse of the
special master’s discretion in making this determination. 78 The five
matters included the following actions that constituted violations of the
Rules of Professional Conduct. 79
In one matter, Mr. Johnson failed to attend hearings and, upon being
contacted by the judge’s secretary about one absence, did not disclose that
he was under interim suspension at the time. 80 In another, Mr. Johnson
represented an executor and took possession of over $340,000 but did not
deposit it into a trust account, gave misleading information about the
funds to the client, did not disburse the funds when requested, and
eventually returned the funds with a cashier’s check that was not written
on his trust account. 81 The third matter involved improper solicitation of
a client who had been in an automobile accident. Mr. Johnson performed
work for her while he was suspended without disclosing the suspension
but also failed to respond to the client’s requests for information and
failed to appear in court on her behalf. 82 In the fourth matter, Mr.
Johnson represented clients in Alabama, where he is not licensed to
practice. He forged an Alabama attorney’s name on the complaint and
later forged his clients’ names on a certificate of service for notice of
dismissal of the case and falsely informed the clients that the case was
progressing well. Mr. Johnson was indicted in Alabama for possession of
a forged instrument and lied to the state bar of Georgia when he said that
the Alabama lawyer had given him authority to file the case. 83 Finally,
in the fifth matter Mr. Johnson represented a divorce client while he was
under suspension and did not inform the client of the suspension and
otherwise failed to communicate adequately with the client. 84
The supreme court noted the following factors in aggravation:
dishonest or selfish motive; pattern of misconduct and multiple offenses;
refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his actions; intentional
failure to comply with the Rules regarding disciplinary matters;
vulnerability of his victims; substantial experience in the practice of law;

In re Johnson, 308 Ga. 233, 234–35 838 S.E.2d 755, 756–57 (2020).
Id. at 235, 838 S.E.2d at 757.
79 Id. at 234, 838 S.E.2d at 756.
80 Id. at 235, 838 S.E.2d at 757.
81 Id. at 235–36, 838 S.E.2d at 757–58.
82 Id. at 236, 838 S.E.2d at 758.
83 Id. at 236–37, 838 S.E.2d at 758.
84 Id. at 237, 838 S.E.2d at 758.
77
78
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and indifference to making restitution. 85 The court found no mitigating
factors and disbarred Mr. Johnson. 86
The supreme court disbarred Millard C. Farmer after he was deemed
in default in the disciplinary proceedings for failing to file an amended
answer that conformed to the requirements of the bar Rules, as ordered
by the special master. 87 By reason of his default, Mr. Farmer admitted
the allegations against him. 88
The allegations arose from a series of actions that Mr. Farmer took in
the course of representing a client (Wife) in post-divorce proceedings.
Wife’s ex-husband filed a petition to modify the child custody
arrangement, and in response Mr. Farmer advised and assisted the wife
in a series of actions intended to disrupt the proceedings. These included
filing frivolous motions and appeals; threatening witnesses; engaging in
ad hominem attacks against parties, the trial judge, and the judge’s staff;
counseling Wife not to participate in a child custody evaluation;
discussing issues about custody with the parties’ children (in violation of
a court order); and refusing to appear at the subsequent hearing on
contempt (at which Mr. Farmer and his client were held in contempt). 89
Mr. Farmer also counseled the Wife to encourage the parties’ children to
run away from their father’s home and endeavored to create evidence of
child abuse and neglect by the father. On behalf of his client, Mr. Farmer
sued a court reporter and, after the case was dismissed, filed an appeal
that resulted in sanctions by the Georgia Court of Appeals for filing a
frivolous appeal. 90 As a result of his actions, Mr. Farmer was found civilly
liable for numerous acts of racketeering, including attempted theft by
extortion, attempted bribery, intimidation of a court officer, influencing
witnesses, and employing interstate travel to interfere with the father’s
lawful custody of his children. 91 Mr. Farmer did not satisfy this civil
judgment. 92
The supreme court found that this conduct violated numerous Rules
of Professional Conduct and that aggravating factors included a pattern
of misconduct, multiple violations, intentional noncompliance in the
disciplinary process, refusal to acknowledge that his conduct was
wrongful, substantial experience in the practice of law, and indifference

Id., 838 S.E.2d at 759.
Id.
87 In re Farmer, 307 Ga. 307, 307–08, 835 S.E.2d 629, 630 (2019).
88 Id. at 308, 835 S.E.2d at 630.
89 Id. at 308, 835 S.E.2d at 630–31.
90 Id. at 309, 835 S.E.2d at 631.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 310, 835 S.E.2d at 632.
85
86
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to restitution. 93 The court concluded that “we have little difficulty
concluding that disbarment is the appropriate sanction in this matter.” 94
The supreme court accepted the voluntary surrender of the license of
Timothy Paul Healy. 95 Numerous grievances had been filed against Mr.
Healy. He underwent two alcohol and drug evaluations, the second of
which specifically found that Mr. Healy’s condition impaired his ability
to practice and put the public at risk. 96 Mr. Healy then sought to
surrender his license under Rule 4-104, 97 which provides that it is
grounds for removal from the practice of law if alcohol abuse or substance
abuse to the extent of impairing the lawyer’s competency to practice
law. 98 Mr. Healy asserted that he had taken steps to wind down his
practice and promised not to seek reinstatement, even if he recovers from
his current conditions. 99
B.

Suspensions 100

1.
Six-Month Suspensions
The supreme court suspended two lawyers for six months.
The supreme court suspended Barry Wayne Rorex for six months, as
a matter of reciprocal discipline, after he was suspended for that length
of time in Arizona. 101 Mr. Rorex had abandoned matters for three clients
in Arizona. He failed to communicate with those clients; return their files
or unearned fees; or respond to the Arizona bar. 102
The supreme court accepted a voluntary petition and suspended
Howard L. Sosnik for six months, as reciprocal discipline after Mr. Sosnik
received that discipline in New York. 103 Mr. Sosnik admitted that he
failed to review, audit, and reconcile his firm’s trust account and did not
adequately supervise an employee of his practice, with the result that the
employee was able to steal client funds and cause the firm’s trust account
to have a deficiency. 104 Mr. Sosnik self-reported the matter in New York,

Id. at 310, 835 S.E.2d at 632.
Id.
95 In re Healy, 308 Ga. 658, 660, 842 S.E.2d 844, 845 (2020).
96 Id. at 659, 842 S.E.2d at 844.
97 GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-104 (2020).
98 Healy, 308 Ga. at 660, 842 S.E.2d at 845.
99 Id. at 659, 842 S.E.2d at 845.
100 This Article discusses only those suspensions that constitute final discipline and does
not discuss interim suspensions.
101 In re Rorex, 308 Ga. 488, 490, 841 S.E.2d 662, 663 (2020).
102 Id. at 489, 841 S.E.2d at 662.
103 In re Sosnik, 308 Ga. 823, 823, 843 S.E.2d 402, 403 (2020).
104 Id., 843 S.E.2d at 402.
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and his firm replaced all the missing funds. 105 The court noted in
mitigation that Mr. Sosnik was candid and cooperative with the bar
authorities, had undertaken interim rehabilitation by instituting proper
banking and bookkeeping practices, was remorseful, had good character,
had no prior discipline, and did not act from a selfish motive. 106 In
aggravation, the court noted that Mr. Sosnik was experienced and had a
background in accounting, yet, because of his inadequate supervision of
the employee, he missed several early warning signs that the employee
was stealing client’s money. 107 The supreme court found that the sixmonth suspension was appropriate. 108
2.
Suspensions Longer Than Six Months
The supreme court suspended one lawyer for longer than six months
during the Survey period.
The supreme court accepted a petition for voluntary discipline and
imposed a twelve-month suspension on Preston B. Kunda. 109 Mr. Kunda
was retained to prepare a will for a client but also agreed to serve as the
estate’s executor without obtaining written informed consent to the
conflict of interest between his role as attorney for the individual and as
executor of the estate. Mr. Kunda also sold a gun collection for the client
but did not deposit all of the cash proceeds of the sale into his trust
account. Finally, Mr. Kunda prepared a codicil to the client’s will under
which, if the client died before the sale of the gun collection could be
finalized, Mr. Kunda would inherit the gun collection, sell it and give the
money to the client’s beneficiary. Mr. Kunda admitted that this
arrangement was a violation of Rule 1.8(c), 110 under which Mr. Kunda
was prohibited from preparing an instrument that would give him a
substantial gift. 111 The supreme court noted that, despite Mr. Kunda’s
admission of a violation of Rule 1.8(c), this particular arrangement may
not have constituted a gift but rather may have been more appropriately
characterized as a constructive trust. 112 The supreme court noted that
Mr. Kunda had no prior disciplinary history, had been cooperative, and
was remorseful. 113

Id.
Id. at 824, 843 S.E.2d at 402–03.
107 Id., 843 S.E.2d at 403.
108 Id.
109 In re Kunda, 306 Ga. 109, 109 829 S.E.2d 65, 66 (2019).
110 GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(c) (2020).
111 Kunda, 306 Ga. at 109–10, 829 S.E.2d at 66.
112 Id. at 110, n.2, 829 S.E.2d at 66, n.2.
113 Id. at 110, 829 S.E.2d at 66.
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Public reprimands

The supreme court ordered two public reprimands during the Survey
period.
The supreme court accepted a petition for voluntary discipline and
ordered a public reprimand of Cheryl Joyce Braziel. 114 The special master
found that Ms. Braziel attempted to learn whether a hospital had filed a
Medicaid lien against a current client. 115 She recalled that a previous
client had received a letter about such a lien from a particular lawyer.
While she was traveling, Ms. Braziel instructed her assistant to copy that
earlier letter and place it in her current client’s file as a reminder to
contact the hospital’s lawyer about the current client. The assistant
instead created a new letter, patterned after the old one, that purported
to be from the hospital’s lawyer about a lien related to Ms. Braziel’s
current client. Although Ms. Braziel admonished her assistant for the
mistake, the new letter eventually made its way to the hospital’s lawyer.
When that lawyer confronted Ms. Braziel, she admitted what had
occurred, took responsibility, and tried to explain. 116
The special master found on these facts that Ms. Braziel had violated
her training and supervisory responsibilities with respect to a nonlawyer assistant (Rule 5.3 117) and noted a number of mitigating factors,
including a lack of prior discipline, lack of a selfish motive or intent to
deceive, personal health problems, efforts to rectify the consequences of
her misconduct, acceptance of responsibility and remorse, and
cooperation in the disciplinary proceeding. 118 The only aggravating factor
was Ms. Braziel’s substantial experience. 119 The supreme court accepted
the special master’s findings and recommendation and ordered a public
reprimand. 120
The supreme court ordered a public reprimand of Edward Neal
Davis. 121 Mr. Davis represented a client in the purchase of real estate
from a husband and wife, who were former clients of Mr. Davis. The
husband was present for the closing, but the wife was not. Nevertheless,
based upon the husband’s representation that the wife had signed the
documents, Mr. Davis notarized both signatures. The wife later claimed
in divorce proceedings that she had not signed the documents. 122 Mr.
In re Braziel, 306 Ga. 385, 385, 830 S.E.2d 730, 731 (2019).
Id. at 385–86, 830 S.E.2d at 731.
116 Id. at 386, 830 S.E.2d at 731.
117 GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2020).
118 Braziel, 306 Ga. at 386–87, 830 S.E.2d at 731–32.
119 Id. at 387, 830 S.E.2d at 732.
120 Id. at 388, 830 S.E.2d at 732.
121 In re Davis, 306 Ga. 381, 383, 830 S.E.2d 734, 736 (2019).
122 Id. at 381, 830 S.E.2d at 735.
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Davis’s false notarization constituted a violation of Rules 4.1(a) 123 (duty
of truthfulness in statements to others) and 8.4(a)(4) 124 (misconduct to
engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation). 125 Mr. Davis also negligently deposited personal
funds into his trust account and then paid a personal debt from the funds
that he had mistakenly deposited. 126
In mitigation, Mr. Davis had no prior disciplinary record, intent to
harm, or dishonest or selfish motive. He expressed remorse, accepted
responsibility, and cooperated in the disciplinary process. In aggravation,
Mr. Davis had substantial experience in the practice of law. 127
D. Review board reprimands
The supreme court ordered two review board reprimands during the
Survey period.
The supreme court accepted a petition for voluntary discipline and
ordered a review board reprimand for Hakeem Bertrand Brock. 128 All of
Mr. Brock’s misconduct related to his trust account. Mr. Brock admitted
that he failed to provide proper supervision of a paralegal, who forged
Mr. Brock’s signature on $21,000 worth of checks on Mr. Brock’s trust
account. The paralegal wrote the checks to friends and members of her
family, and people whom the paralegal purported to represent as a
lawyer. The theft was possible because Mr. Brock did not keep adequate
records of the funds in his trust account. Mr. Brock replaced the funds
and fired the paralegal. 129 It also came to light that: (1) Mr. Brock had
made a student loan payment from his trust account, using funds that
were earned attorney’s fees but which had not been removed from the
trust account; and (2) Mr. Brock made two mortgage payments for a
former client from his trust account, using funds that belonged to the
former client but which Mr. Brock had failed to promptly deliver to the
former client. 130
The court noted in aggravation that there were multiple offenses and
that Mr. Brock had substantial experience in the practice of law. In
mitigation, the court found that Mr. Brock did not have a prior
disciplinary record; that he did not have a dishonest or selfish motive;
that he undertook timely, good-faith efforts to make restitution and
GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a) (2020).
GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a)(4) (2020).
125 Davis, 306 Ga. at 382, 830 S.E.2d at 735.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 382–83, 830 S.E.2d at 736.
128 In re Brock, 306 Ga. 388, 390, 830 S.E.2d 736, 738 (2019).
129 Id. at 388–89, 830 S.E.2d at 737.
130 Id. at 389, 830 S.E.2d at 737–38.
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otherwise to rectify the consequences of his misconduct; that he showed
remorse; and that he cooperated in the disciplinary process. 131
The supreme court accepted a petition for voluntary discipline in the
form of a state disciplinary review board reprimand from Muhammed
Abdul-Warit Abdur-Rahim. 132 Mr. Abdur-Rahim admitted that he
violated Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 3.5 133 when he appeared
in court as a defendant on charges of family violence battery, cruelty to
children, and disorderly conduct. 134 Mr. Abdur-Rahim engaged in
disruptive conduct, including being unduly argumentative with the
prosecutors, using profanity, and failing to follow the instructions of the
judge. In mitigation, he showed that he had no prior disciplinary record,
that his conduct was an isolated incident, that he was suffering from
emotional and personal problems at the time, that he had obtained
treatment for those problems, that he apologized to the judge and the
court staff, that he cooperated with the state bar, and that he was
remorseful. 135
E.

Petition for reinstatement accepted

The supreme court accepted one petition for reinstatement during the
Survey period.
Christopher Aaron Corley was suspended from the practice of law in
2018 after he pled guilty in South Carolina to first-degree domestic
violence. 136 Although disbarment is the usual discipline for a felony
conviction, Mr. Corley presented significant mitigating evidence. 137 The
supreme court imposed conditions on his reinstatement when it
suspended him, which included that he complete his sentence of
probation in South Carolina, that a board-certified and licensed mental
health professional certify that he is fit to return to the practice of law,
and that he provide evidence that he is continuing to receive mental
health treatment from a board-certified and licensed medical
professional. 138 The supreme court stated that these conditions had been
met and reinstated Mr. Corley to the practice of law. 139

Id. at 389–90, 830 S.E.2d at 738.
In re Abdur-Rahim, 308 Ga. 485, 486, 841 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2020).
133 GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.5(a) (2020).
134 Abdur-Rahim, 308 Ga. at 485, 841 S.E.2d at 666.
135 Id.
136 In re Corley, 303 Ga. 290, 290, 811 S.E.2d 347, 347 (2018).
137 Id. at 291, 811 S.E.2d at 347–48.
138 Id. at 293, 811 S.E.2d at 349.
139 In re Corley, 307 Ga. 788, 788, 838 S.E.2d 588, 588 (2020).
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Notice of Discipline Rejected

The supreme court took the unusual step of rejecting a notice of
discipline against a lawyer who defaulted in the disciplinary process. 140
By reason of his default, attorney Joel S. Wadsworth admitted that he
was representing several plaintiffs in a civil case and failed on multiple
occasions to respond to requests for information from his clients. That
constitutes a violation of Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4, the
maximum sanction for which is a public reprimand. While the case was
pending, Mr. Wadsworth failed to pay his bar dues but did not withdraw
from the representation or take actions to protect the client’s interests
upon withdrawal. 141 That was a violation of Rule 1.16, 142 and the
maximum sanction for violation of Rule 1.16 is also a public
reprimand. 143
The State Bar’s notice of discipline sought disbarment on the basis of
Mr. Wadsworth’s violation of Rule 5.5(a), 144 which forbade him from
continuing to represent these clients once he was ineligible to practice for
failure to pay his dues. 145 The maximum sanction for such a violation is
disbarment. 146 The supreme court, however, declined to disbar Mr.
Wadsworth in the absence of information regarding the extent to which
he continued to represent his clients after he was no longer eligible to do
so. 147 The court expressed its hope that a future filing of the State Bar
would either contain additional information sufficient to support
disbarment or would seek a lesser sanction that would be appropriate for
Mr. Wadsworth’s misconduct. 148
G. Petitions for voluntary discipline rejected
The supreme court rejected five petitions for voluntary discipline
during the Survey period.
The supreme court declined to accept a petition for voluntary
discipline from Philip Norman Golub, even though the state bar
supported the petition. 149 Mr. Golub had filed two lawsuits for a client
(whose son was the primary contact), and he eventually received
instructions from his client to resolve them as quickly as possible.
In re Wadsworth, 307 Ga. 311, 312, 835 S.E.2d 632, 634 (2019).
Id.
142 GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2020).
143 Wadsworth, 307 Ga. at 311, 835 S.E.2d at 633.
144 GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(a) (2020).
145 Wadsworth, 307 Ga. at 311, 835 S.E.2d at 633.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 311–12, 835 S.E.2d at 633.
148 Id. at 312, 835 S.E.2d at 633–34.
149 In re Golub, 306 Ga. 620, 622, 832 S.E.2d 332, 333 (2019).
140
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Instead, Mr. Golub continued to extend the discovery period and made
no effort to have the cases put on a trial calendar, all the while not
consistently responding to his client’s requests for information. Mr.
Golub was then hospitalized, and motions to dismiss the cases were
made. Believing that the court would grant the motions, Mr. Golub
voluntarily dismissed them but did not tell the client or the client’s son
until the son contacted him. Several months later, after his client had
died, Mr. Golub filed renewal actions (without consent) but never had the
defendants served, failed to substitute the proper party for his deceased
client, failed to perform any more work on the cases, and did not
communicate with the son about the status. Mr. Golub’s petition also
admitted that he had no further communications with the son, did not
provide any billing information to the client or the son, and did not return
an unearned fee. 150 The petition admitted violation of numerous Rules,
including Rule 1.3 (diligence) and Rule 1.4 (communication).
Significantly, Mr. Golub’s petition also admitted a violation of Rule
8.4(a)(4), which concerns professional conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. 151 Mr. Golub offered in mitigation
that he was dealing with a severe illness, that he had no dishonest or
selfish motive, that he was remorseful, and that his only prior discipline
was remote in time. 152 He also stated that he intends to repay the client’s
son “to the extent that he is able[.]” 153
The supreme court rejected the petition for two reasons. 154 First, the
court noted that the facts as admitted would not necessarily support the
conclusion that Mr. Golub engaged in professional conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. 155 The court cited several
recent cases in which it has expressed similar concerns about admitted
violations of particular Rules in cases where the admitted facts might not
support the supposed violation. 156 The court was also concerned that Mr.
Golub had neither made complete restitution to the client’s son nor
expressed an intention to do so. 157 Instead, Mr. Golub had only stated
that he would “pay as much of the money” back as he is “able” to pay. 158

Id. at 620–21, 832 S.E.2d at 332–33.
Id. at 620, 832 S.E.2d at 332.
152 Id. at 621, 832 S.E.2d at 333.
153 Id., 832 S.E.2d at 333.
154 Id. at 621–22, 832 S.E.2d at 333.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 622, 832 S.E.2d at 333.
158 Id. The ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS lists as a mitigating
factor, “timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct”
(§10 (4)(d)). The supreme court appears to be requiring more when it rejects Mr. Golub’s
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The supreme court rejected a second petition for voluntary discipline
in the form of a public reprimand despite the recommendation of the
State Bar and the special master that the petition be granted. 159 The
lawyer had been disciplined for other misconduct in 2004 and 2010. 160 In
the most recent matter, both the first and second petitions for voluntary
discipline admitted that the lawyer undertook to represent a client who
had been injured in an automobile accident, abandoned the client, ceased
communicating with the client, and failed to protect the client’s interests
even though the lawyer had effectively withdrawn from representing
him. 161 The court rejected the lawyer’s first petition because it did not
reveal whether her previous disciplinary matters involved similar
conduct. 162 The second petition made it clear that the earlier sanctions
were for similar conduct, but the special master nevertheless
recommended a public reprimand given the steps the lawyer had taken
to improve her office practices, including a meeting with the State Bar’s
law practice management program. 163 The supreme court noted that such
a step is a mitigating factor but held that it was outweighed by the lack
of any explanation why it took so many disciplinary actions to get the
lawyer to take it. 164 The court held that a “short suspension would likely
be sufficient” 165 but rejected the petition because it sought at most a
public reprimand. 166
The supreme court rejected a voluntary petition for discipline in the
form of a suspension from David Godley Rigdon. 167 Mr. Rigdon was
indicted on thirteen counts of drug offenses, including conspiracy and
crossing the guard lines of a correctional institution with drugs. Mr.
Rigdon pled guilty to eight of the alleged offenses; the other charges,
including the conspiracy charge and three charges relating to drugs and
correctional institutions, were nolle prossed. He was sentenced as a first
offender to five years’ probation. 168
In seeking suspension rather than the usual sanction of disbarment
for a felony conviction, Mr. Rigdon offered evidence that his criminal
conduct occurred at a time of personal and emotional problems, that he
petition, in part, because he “states no intention of making the client’s son whole.” In re
Golub, 306 Ga. at 622, 832 S.E.2d at 333.
159 In re Hemmann, 307 Ga. 56, 59, 834 S.E.2d 105, 107 (2019).
160 Id. at 58, 834 S.E.2d at 107.
161 Id. at 56, 834 S.E.2d at 106.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 58, 834 S.E.2d at 107.
164 Id. at 58–59, 834 S.E.2d at 107.
165 Id.at 59, 834 S.E.2d at 107.
166 Id.
167 In re Rigdon, 307 Ga. 676, 678, 837 S.E.2d 759, 761 (2020).
168 Id. at 676, 837 S.E.2d at 759–60.
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was diagnosed with anxiety and depression, that he has been undergoing
successful treatment, that he has never before been subject to discipline,
that he voluntarily ceased practicing law and returned all unearned fees,
and that he was fully cooperative with the bar in the disciplinary
proceeding. Mr. Rigdon also offered letters attesting to his good character
from three members of the Georgia bar. 169 The State Bar and the special
master recommended that the supreme court reject the petition. 170
The supreme court rejected the petition because it contained
insufficient information. 171 In particular, the court noted that it
contained no information other than the indictment as to the facts
underlying the guilty plea, the nature of the conspiracy of which Mr.
Rigdon was alleged to have been a part, or the three counts relating to
correctional institutions. 172 The court concluded that without this
information it would be unable to determine whether the requested
discipline would be appropriate. 173
The supreme court rejected a second voluntary petition for discipline,
this time in the form of a thirty-day suspension, from William Leslie
Kirby III. 174 Mr. Kirby submitted some additional information with the
second petition, including more detail about how the grievances came
about, a letter from a psychologist attesting that Mr. Kirby was under
his care, a description of changes Mr. Kirby had made to his practice
(interim rehabilitation), and an expression of deep remorse. 175
The supreme court found that a thirty-day suspension, which the
special master and the State Bar supported, would be insufficient in light
of the four grievances pending against Mr. Kirby. 176 Those grievances
alleged that Mr. Kirby violated numerous Rules of professional conduct
in multiple matters, including his duties of diligence (Rule 1.3) and
communication (Rule 1.4), as well as his duties upon withdrawal (Rule
1.16(d)). 177 Mr. Kirby also had been disciplined before. 178 The supreme
court noted that it had imposed suspensions of four months or more in
similar cases that involved neglect of multiple clients, prior discipline,

Id. at 677, 837 S.E.2d at 760.
Id. at 677–78, 837 S.E.2d at 760.
171 Id. at 678, 837 S.E.2d at 761.
172 Id., 837 S.E.2d at 761.
173 Id., 837 S.E.2d at 761.
174 In re Kirby, 307 Ga. 316, 316–17, 835 S.E.2d 637 (2019).
175 Id. at 318–19, 835 S.E.2d at 638–39.
176 Id. at 320, 835 S.E.2d at 639.
177 Id. at 316, 835 S.E.2d at 637.
178 Id. at 319, 835 S.E.2d at 639.
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and doubts about the lawyer’s ability to fulfill his professional
obligations. 179
The supreme court rejected the petition for voluntary discipline in the
form of a review board or public reprimand, which the state bar
supported, from Nevada M. Tuggle. 180 The case involved two
grievances. 181
Mr. Tuggle entered into an engagement agreement with a client who
was a defendant in a civil suit. The agreement provided that Mr. Tuggle
could charge the client’s credit card for fees as they were incurred, upon
twelve hours’ notice. Mr. Tuggle failed to file a timely answer in the case
and did not respond to the client’s requests for information, but he did
charge the client’s credit card $1000, without notice to the client. Mr.
Tuggle did eventually file a late answer but thereafter did no further
work on the case and ceased communicating with his client and opposing
counsel. 182 The plaintiff eventually obtained a default judgment against
Mr. Tuggle’s client in excess of $815,000, which the client learned about
when she received notice of a garnishment. The client then made several
unsuccessful attempts to obtain her file but only received it after she filed
a grievance. The client sued Mr. Tuggle for malpractice. 183
In the other matter, Mr. Tuggle agreed to file an application for VA
benefits for a client and to prepare a revocable trust, a deed, a will, a
financial power of attorney, and an advanced directive for health care.
Mr. Tuggle did none of these things, except that he filed the application
for VA benefits, albeit using the wrong social security number. The client
died before his application could be corrected and processed. 184
Mr. Tuggle offered in mitigation that he had been cooperative with
the bar and was remorseful, and he also submitted some information
regarding “unspecified substance abuse issues” during the time of the
events giving rise to the grievances. 185 Although the State Bar supported
the petition, it noted in aggravation that the grievances involved multiple
violations and vulnerable victims and that Mr. Tuggle had substantial
experience in the practice of law. 186
The supreme court rejected the petition and expressed two
concerns. 187 The first was that there was nothing in the petition to
Id. at 320, 835 S.E.2d at 639.
In re Tuggle, 307 Ga. 312, 313, 835 S.E.2d 634, 634 (2019).
181 Id.
182 Id. at 313–14, 835 S.E.2d at 635.
183 Id. at 314, 835 S.E.2d at 635.
184 Id. at 314–15, 835 S.E.2d at 635–36.
185 Id. at 315, 835 S.E.2d at 636.
186 Id.
187 Id.
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indicate that Mr. Tuggle had accepted financial responsibility for his
conduct and made restitution. 188 Of particular concern was the lack of
information about the status of the malpractice action involving the first
client and damages of over $800,000. 189 The supreme court also
expressed concern that the information about Mr. Tuggle’s substance
abuse issues lacked specificity. 190
H. One miscellaneous disciplinary case
In one miscellaneous disciplinary case, the supreme court reversed a
special master’s ruling that the State Bar was entitled to summary
judgment. 191 D. Duston Tapley Jr., filed a motion to withdraw as counsel
in a criminal case after the jury had been selected and told that court
that, due to his age (he was in his eighties), he was no longer physically
and mentally capable of representing his clients. After learning about
this hearing, the chief judges of two circuits met with Mr. Tapley, who
agreed that he would withdraw as counsel in pending criminal cases and
refrain from undertaking new cases in those circuits. 192
The State Bar initiated disciplinary proceedings against Mr.
Tapley. 193 The evidentiary record included deposition testimony from a
psychologist to the effect that, although Mr. Tapley had experienced age
appropriate cognitive decline, there was no evidence of psychological or
mental health issues and that Mr. Tapley’s cognitive abilities were in the
normal range. The psychologist acknowledged that he had evaluated Mr.
Tapley’s ability to function generally and not specifically with respect to
his ability to practice law. 194
The special master granted summary judgment to the State Bar and
disregarded the psychologist’s evidence because it did not relate to Mr.
Tapley’s ability to be competent as a lawyer. 195 The special master
recommended disbarment under Rule 4-104(a), 196 which provides that it
is grounds for removal from the practice of law if a lawyer has a cognitive
impairment to the extent of impairing the lawyer’s competency to
practice law. The supreme court reversed, finding that the psychologist’s
report was some evidence that Mr. Tapley was competent to practice law
and that therefore there was a genuine issue of material fact on that
Id. at 315–16, 835 S.E.2d at 636.
Id. at 316, 835 S.E.2d at 636.
190 Id.
191 In re Tapley, 308 Ga. 577, 577, 842 S.E.2d 36, 37 (2020).
192 Id. at 577–78, 842 S.E.2d at 37–38.
193 Id. at 579, 842 S.E.2d at 38.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-104(a) (2020).
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point. 197 The court remanded the case to the special master for an
evidentiary hearing. 198
III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
A.

Cases in which a claim of ineffective assistance succeeded

During the Survey period, the Georgia Supreme Court decided three
cases in which a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel succeeded,
while the court of appeals decided four such cases.
1.
Georgia Supreme Court
Sean Swanson was found guilty of felony murder for shooting Noel
Reed during a sale of marijuana. 199 Mr. Swanson shot the victim from the
driver’s seat of Swanson’s car, after the victim had pulled out his own
gun. 200 Mr. Swanson’s trial counsel asked for and received a jury
instruction on self-defense but did not seek a jury instruction on defense
of habitation. Significantly, self-defense is not available to someone, like
Swanson, who kills someone during the commission of a felony, such as
Mr. Swanson’s sale of marijuana. On the other hand, the defense of
habitation contains no such restriction. 201 Mr. Swanson’s trial counsel
did not request an instruction on defense of habitation, because, he said,
he did not realize that “habitation” included a motor vehicle. 202
The supreme court unanimously held that Mr. Swanson had received
ineffective assistance of counsel. 203 The court held that counsel’s conduct
performance at trial was objectively unreasonable and that it was
reasonably probable that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial
would have been different. 204
As to the first condition, the court stated that trial counsel’s failure to
request a charge on defense of habitation was objectively
unreasonable. 205 There was sufficient evidence in the record to support a
charge of defense of habitation. 206 Trial counsel did request and receive
a charge on one justification defense, self-defense, which legally was not
available to Mr. Swanson because he shot the victim during the
Tapley, 308 Ga. at 581, 842 S.E.2d at 39.
Id.
199 Swanson v. State, 306 Ga. 153, 153, 829 S.E.2d 312, 313 (2019).
200 Id. at 153, 829 S.E.2d at 314.
201 Id. at 156, 829 S.E.2d at 316
202 Id. at 158, 829 S.E.2d at 317.
203 Id. at 164, 829 S.E.2d at 321.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 158, 829 S.E.2d at 317.
206 Id. at 157, 829 S.E.2d at 316.
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commission of a felony. 207 A failure to raise another justification defense,
defense of habitation—which was available to Swanson even if he was
committing a felony at the time—could not have been a matter of strategy
but rather could only be explained by trial counsel’s lack of
understanding of the law. 208 That was objectively unreasonable
performance. 209
As to the prejudice prong, the court relied on two events during the
trial. 210 First, the prosecutor in closing emphasized that Mr. Swanson
had shot the victim while selling marijuana and, thereby, forfeited his
right to claim self-defense. 211 As the supreme court noted, this argument
capitalized on defense counsel’s failure to raise defense of habitation
(which is available even during the commission of a felony) and also
seemed to concede that, but for the fact that the shooting happened
during a felony, Mr. Swanson would have had a strong claim of
justification. 212 The supreme court also noted that the jury had submitted
a question about the charge of self-defense and wanted to know if it was
“bound” by the unavailability of self-defense for those who harm someone
during the commission of a felony. 213 The supreme court inferred from
the jury’s focus on this limitation of self-defense that it was reasonably
probable that the jury would have found that the killing was justified by
defense of habitation if that instruction had been given and the jury had
therefor been free to disregard the fact that Mr. Swanson killed the
victim during the commission of a felony. 214 As a result of trial counsel’s
ineffectiveness, the supreme court ordered a new trial for Mr.
Swanson. 215
Ashley and Albert Debelbot were convicted of murdering their infant
daughter by inflicting blunt force trauma. 216 In closing argument, the
prosecutor gave the following gross misstatement of the “beyond a
reasonable doubt” standard:
Reasonable doubt. The Judge will charge you on reasonable doubt.
Just keep in mind, and he will charge you, reasonable doubt does not
mean beyond all doubt. It does not mean to a mathematical certainty.
Which means we don’t have to prove that ninety percent. You don’t
Id. at 157–58, 829 S.E.2d at 316–17.
Id. at 158, 829 S.E.2d at 317.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 161, 829 S.E.2d at 319.
211 Id. at 162, 829 S.E.2d at 319.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 162, 829 S.E.2d at 319–20.
214 Id. at 162, 829 S.E.2d at 320.
215 Id. at 164, 829 S.E.2d at 321.
216 Debelbot v. State, 308 Ga. 165, 165, 839 S.E.2d 513, 515 (2020).
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have to be ninety percent sure. You don’t have to be eighty percent
sure. You don’t have to be fifty-one percent sure. It does not mean to a
mathematical certainty.
And it does not mean beyond a shadow of a doubt. That’s just
something the [television] made up. It’s actually beyond a reasonable
doubt. And that would be a doubt to which you can attach a reason.
And I submit to you there is no reasonable doubt in this case. 217

Defense counsel did not object to this argument, and the supreme court
held that no competent attorney would have failed to make such an
objection. 218 The court also held that the Debelbots had made a sufficient
showing of prejudice. 219 Although the court had earlier held that the
evidence against them was sufficient to sustain the conviction, the court
noted that this was a “close question” and noted further that evidence of
their criminal intent was “underwhelming.” 220 The supreme court
reversed the convictions. 221
A jury convicted Antiwan Lane of malice murder for hiring Kevin
Stallworth to kill Hector Gonzales; Mr. Stallworth mistakenly shot and
killed Ivan Perez instead. 222 Mr. Stallworth was the state’s primary
witness, and he testified to the details of the plot to kill Mr. Gonzales as
well as its botched execution and the aftermath. 223 Mr. Stallworth’s story
was substantially corroborated by hearsay testimony from Mr.
Stallworth’s girlfriend, which the trial court erroneously allowed over
objection. 224 The trial court initially accepted the argument that the
statements from Mr. Stallworth to the girlfriend were admissible as
statements in furtherance of a conspiracy, but the trial court later
concluded that ruling was erroneous, and the Georgia Supreme Court
agreed that it was error. 225
The state also used the testimony of the lead investigator, Detective
Delima. 226 In connection with that testimony, defense counsel rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel in two respects, in the opinion of both
the trial court and the supreme court. 227 First, Detective Delima testified
falsely that Mr. Lane’s cousin, Eddie Davis, confirmed to the detective
Id. at 167, 839 S.E.2d at 516 (alterations made by the supreme court).
Id., 839 S.E.2d at 516–17.
219 Id. at 168, 839 S.E.2d at 517.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 170, 839 S.E.2d at 518.
222 State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 10, 838 S.E.2d 808, 810 (2020).
223 Id. at 11, 838 S.E.2d at 811.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 19–20, 838 S.E.2d at 816–17.
226 Id. at 11, 838 S.E.2d at 811.
227 Id. at 13, 838 S.E.2d at 812.
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Mr. Stallworth’s statement that Mr. Lane had initially tried to hire Mr.
Davis to kill Mr. Gonzales. The detective’s report showed that Mr. Davis
had expressly denied that anyone had tried to recruit him to kill Mr.
Gonzales. Defense counsel had been provided with that report but
inexplicably failed to cross-examine the detective about his false
testimony. 228 Second, Detective Delima testified extensively to hearsay
and gave statements that bolstered Mr. Stallworth’s testimony. Defense
counsel did not object, and there was no apparent strategic reason why
any competent lawyer would not have done so. Not even the state offered
any such reason. 229
The supreme court took the occasion of this case to overrule a long
line of cases that had held that Georgia would not recognize the
“cumulative error Rule” and ruled instead that “the proper approach . . .
is to consider collectively the prejudicial effect, if any, of trial court errors,
along with the prejudice caused by any deficient performance of
counsel.” 230 In this case, the supreme court looked at the cumulative
effect of the ineffective assistance of counsel and the erroneous admission
of the girlfriend’s testimony in determining that Mr. Lane was prejudiced
by his counsel’s ineffectiveness:
By virtue of trial counsel’s deficient performance, the jury also heard
a detective’s testimony that he had confirmed certain details about the
crime, including that the shooting was a murder for hire, from
unnamed sources. And, due to counsel’s deficient performance, the
detective’s false testimony that Stallworth’s now-deceased cousin
confirmed that Lane initially tried to hire him to kill Gonzalez went
unchallenged. We conclude that Lane has shown that, particularly
given that key portions of Thompson’s [the girlfriend] testimony were
erroneously admitted, there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the trial would have been
different. 231

2.
Georgia Court of Appeals
Brandon Jones was convicted of being a felon in possession of a
firearm, a .22 caliber pistol that Jones allegedly had purchased from the
man who had stolen it, Frank Taylor. 232 A crucial issue in the case was
whether Mr. Jones had purchased the gun from Mr. Taylor. Mr. Jones
testified at trial that he had not done so. 233 An investigator for the City
Id. at 18–19, 838 S.E.2d at 815–16.
Id. at 19, 838 S.E.2d at 816.
230 Id. at 17, 838 S.E.2d at 815.
231 Id. at 22–23, 838 S.E.2d at 818.
232 Jones v. State, 350 Ga. App. 618, 618–19, 829 S.E.2d 820, 823 (2019).
233 Id. at 619, 829 S.E.2d at 823.
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of Oakwood Police Department testified that Mr. Jones had admitted
buying the gun from Mr. Taylor (although the investigator’s written
report did not reflect such an admission). 234 The investigator had also
interviewed Mr. Taylor and was also allowed to testify without objection
that “I had Mr. Taylor advise he sold the gun to Mr. Jones . . . .” 235 Later,
after Jones was convicted, defense counsel and the prosecutor listened to
the recording of Mr. Taylor’s interview with the investigator and
stipulated that “there was no mention in Taylor’s statement to police that
Jones purchased the gun from him . . . .” 236 Mr. Taylor did not testify at
trial. 237
The court of appeals ordered a new trial based upon ineffective
assistance of counsel. 238 Trial counsel’s performance was deficient when
he failed to object to the investigator’s hearsay statements that Mr.
Taylor had told the investigator that Mr. Taylor had sold the gun to Mr.
Jones. 239 Such an out-of-court statement violated the Confrontation
Clause of the United States Constitution, 240 and defense counsel’s failure
to object was objectively unreasonable. 241 The court of appeals further
found that Jones was prejudiced by the failure to object because the
evidence of Mr. Taylor’s alleged statements bolstered the testimony of
the investigator, who had testified that Mr. Jones admitted to buying the
gun. 242 In an understated footnote, the court of appeals noted: “The harm
is more obvious given that the parties later stipulated that Taylor had
not told the investigator that Jones purchased the gun.” 243
In another case, a defendant was convicted of armed robbery and
possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony. 244 The defendant
claimed he acted as a result of coercion. 245 The defendant was a passenger
in a car and claimed that the driver of the car pressed a gun against the
defendant’s leg and told the defendant to “go see what he [the victim]
got.” 246

Id. at 624, 829 S.E.2d at 826.
Id. at 624, 829 S.E.2d at 826–27.
236 Id. at 620, 829 S.E.2d at 824.
237 Id. at 624, 829 S.E.2d at 827.
238 Id. at 626, 829 S.E.2d at 828.
239 Id. at 625, 829 S.E.2d at 827.
240 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
241 Jones, 350 Ga. App. at 625, 829 S.E.2d at 827.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 625, n. 6, 829 S.E.2d at 827, n.6.
244 Jackson v. State, 354 Ga. App. 225, 840 S.E.2d 609, 610 (2020).
245 Id. at 228, 840 S.E.2d at 612.
246 Id. at 227, 840 S.E.2d at 612.
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The defendant and his lawyer met with police to explain what
happened. 247 The meeting was recorded on video. 248 When the detective
asked the defendant why he didn’t just run when he left the car, the
defendant’s lawyer interrupted to say, “Dell, Dell, you’re not going to
convince us that this was reasonable behavior. It wasn’t . . . . What I told
you the first time I met you . . . kind of crazy.” 249 This recording was
played to the jury. Defense counsel made no attempt to redact her
comments that undercut her client’s defense of coercion. 250 The court of
appeals stated that there was no strategic reason to do so and that, in
light of the strength of the other evidence, there was a reasonable
probability of a different result if she had asked for the recording to be
redacted. 251 The court stated that she had rendered ineffective assistance
of counsel and ordered a new trial. 252
Lester Owensby Pauley was convicted of committing multiple crimes
against several women. The charges for which he was convicted included
charges of kidnapping, aggravated battery, false imprisonment, and
terroristic threats that related to incidents that occurred more than four
years before the indictment. 253 The defendant’s trial counsel did not raise
the defense of statute of limitations to these charges as a general
demurrer to the indictment or in a motion in arrest of the judgment. 254
The court of appeals held that this was ineffective assistance of counsel
because the indictment was deficient on its face, given that it was issued
after the statute of limitations had run on these four charges, and that
either the general demurrer or the motion in arrest of judgment would
have prevented conviction of the defendant on these grounds. 255 The
court of appeals reversed the convictions on these counts but let the
convictions on numerous other counts stand. 256
The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of a motion for
new trial for Kemar Henry based upon ineffective assistance of
counsel. 257 The defendant had been convicted of driving under the
influence per se based upon the results of a state-administered blood
test. 258 The defendant had made some statements to the arresting officer
Id.
Id. at 229, 840 S.E.2d at 612.
249 Id. at 227–28, 840 S.E.2d at 612.
250 Id. at 229, 840 S.E.2d at 613.
251 Id. at 230, 840 S.E.2d at 613–14.
252 Id. at 230–31, 840 S.E.2d at 614.
253 Pauley v. State, 355 Ga. App. 47, 842 S.E.2d 499, 503 (2020).
254 Id. at 57, 842 S.E.2d at 509.
255 Id. at 64, 842 S.E.2d at 513–14.
256 Id. at 65, 842 S.E.2d at 514.
257 Henry v. State, 355 Ga. App. 217, 222, 843 S.E.2d 884, 889 (2020).
258 Id. at 218, 843 S.E.2d at 887.
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that reasonably could have been construed as a request for an
independent blood test administered by his doctor. That independent test
was never performed, and therefore the state’s test was inadmissible.
Defendant’s trial counsel did not make a motion to suppress it. 259 The
court of appeals held that the failure to make the motion to suppress was
unreasonable and that the defendant suffered prejudice because, without
the test, the state could not have carried its burden to prove driving
under the influence per se. 260 The court reversed and remanded the case
for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. 261
B. Cases in which orders finding ineffective assistance were reversed or
vacated
The Georgia Supreme Court reversed orders granting new trials to
two defendants based upon the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.
The supreme court reversed a finding by a trial court that defense
counsel had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in a murder
case. 262 The trial court had found that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to call the defendant as a witness, to seek a mistrial when the jury
heard evidence that the defendant was on probation at the time of the
killing, and to introduce booking photos showing scratches on the
defendant. 263 The scratches allegedly would have supported a theory that
the defendant had been provoked and therefore was guilty perhaps of
manslaughter rather than murder. 264
The supreme court held that trial counsel’s decisions were tactical
and were not so unreasonable that no competent attorney would have
done likewise. 265 Although the defendant could have provided evidence
to support the theory that he was provoked into the killing, the defendant
would have been subject to cross-examination about inconsistent pretrial
statements on this point. The defendant also was emotional and had
mental health issues, both of which would have made him unpredictable
as a witness. For both of these reasons, the supreme court held that
defense counsel’s advice not to testify was not unreasonable. 266
The mention of the defendant’s probationary status was in passing
and did not identify the reason for his probation. 267 Defense counsel did
Id. at 220–21, 843 S.E.2d at 888.
Id. at 222, 843 S.E.2d at 889.
261 Id.
262 State v. Goff, 308 Ga. 330, 330–31, 840 S.E.2d 359, 361 (2020).
263 Id. at 333, 840 S.E.2d at 362.
264 Id. at 336, 840 S.E.2d at 364.
265 Id. at 334, 840 S.E.2d at 363.
266 Id. at 334–35, 840 S.E.2d at 363–64.
267 Id. at 335, 840 S.E.2d at 364.
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not ask for a mistrial because in his judgment the trial was going well
and the jury was “pretty good.” 268 The supreme court found that this
tactical decision, too, was not unreasonable. 269
With respect to the photos that would have shown scratches on the
defendant, the court noted that the only way to explain the significance
of the scratches would have been to call the defendant to testify. 270
Because there were sufficient tactical reasons otherwise for the advice
that the defendant should not testify, the decision not to call him to
introduce and explain the scratches in the photos was not an
unreasonable decision. 271
The supreme court also reversed the grant of a writ of habeas corpus
to Larry Williams. 272 Mr. Williams was convicted of armed robbery,
terroristic threats, and use of a hoax device in connection with a bank
robbery. 273Mr. Williams claimed that his appellate counsel was
ineffective by not including on direct appeal two claims that Mr.
Williams’s trial counsel had been ineffective. 274 The supreme court
rejected both contentions. 275
The first was that trial counsel had been ineffective in connection
with the plea-bargaining process. 276 The court gave an instruction to the
jury that they could take into account Mr. Williams’s possession of
recently stolen cash (he was arrested with two pillowcases stuffed with
the bank’s money) in deciding whether he had stolen it. 277 Mr. Williams
contended that, had he known soon enough that this charge was going to
be given, he would have pled guilty. 278 Mr. Williams could not, however,
discharge his burden to show that there had been an offer that he would
have accepted, that the court would have accepted such a plea, or that
his sentence under any such hypothetical plea would have been less. Mr.
Williams presented no evidence that there was a plea offer at all. The
first claim of ineffective assistance of counsel accordingly failed. 279
The second claim was that appellate counsel was ineffective for not
raising on direct appeal that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting

Id.
Id.
270 Id. at 336, 840 S.E.2d at 364.
271 Id.
272 Johnson v. Williams, 308 Ga. 791, 791, 843 S.E.2d 550, 553 (2020).
273 Id., 843 S.E.2d at 553.
274 Id., 843 S.E.2d at 552–53.
275 Id., 843 S.E.2d at 555.
276 Id., 843 S.E.2d at 553.
277 Id. at 793, 843 S.E.2d at 553.
278 Id. at 793–94, 843 S.E.2d at 553.
279 Id. at 795, 843 S.E.2d at 555.
268
269

2020]

LEGAL ETHICS

195

to alleged character evidence. 280 The evidence was testimony from one of
the arresting officers, who testified that bank robbers typically wear
layers of clothing in order to be able to change their appearance and that
they usually change directions frequently as they flee the scene of the
crime. 281 The trial court sustained an objection to this evidence as
speculation. 282 The habeas court held that the trial counsel was
ineffective for not also raising an objection that it was character
evidence. 283 The supreme court reversed, finding that the evidence had
nothing to do with the defendant’s character, that trial counsel’s objection
to it was sustained, and that there was nothing to indicate that the
outcome of the case would have been different if the character evidence
objection had been made. 284
C. Necessity of a hearing
The Georgia Court of Appeals decided that two ineffective assistance
cases needed to be remanded for hearings.
The court remanded one for a hearing on prejudice. A law
enforcement officer with the Athens-Clarke County Police Department
was convicted of child molestation and enticement of a child for indecent
purposes. 285 The police department conducted an internal affairs
investigation into the allegations, and in that investigation the defendant
made statements that are deemed by law to be compelled and therefore
inadmissible against him. Trial counsel objected to the use of the
statements and succeeded in keeping them out of evidence but did not
object to the prosecution’s possession of the internal affairs investigation
file, which the state might have used derivatively, and impermissibly, in
the development of the case. 286 The trial court found without an
evidentiary hearing that the state’s possession of the file did not affect
the result of the trial. 287 The court of appeals held that a hearing was
required and remanded the case for a hearing to determine whether the
state could “show the absence of taint and that the evidence was derived
from legitimate, independent sources.” 288
The court remanded the second case because of a conflict of interest.
Kirk C. Shelton was convicted of armed robbery and aggravated assault
Id. at 793, 843 S.E.2d at 553.
Id.
282 Id. at 794, 843 S.E.2d at 553.
283 Id., 843 S.E.2d at 554.
284 Id. at 797, 843 S.E.2d at 555.
285 Ward v. State, 353 Ga. App. 1, 1, 836 S.E.2d 148, 152 (2019).
286 Id. at 9, 836 S.E.2d at 157.
287 Id. at 12, 836 S.E.2d at 159.
288 Id. at 13, 836 S.E.2d at 159–60.
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after a trial in which he was represented by an assistant public defender
from the Lookout Mountain Office of the Public Defender. 289 Eventually,
an amended motion for new trial was filed by another attorney from that
office, and the amended motion claimed that trial counsel had been
ineffective. That same day, the trial court denied the amended motion for
new trial after a hearing at which the original trial counsel—who then
still worked in the Lookout Mountain Office of the Public Defender—was
not called to testify. 290
The court of appeals held, among other things, that the claim
regarding ineffectiveness of trial counsel had to be remanded for a new
hearing at which Shelton must be represented by conflict-free counsel. 291
A lawyer has a conflict of interest in asserting his or her own
ineffectiveness. 292 Shelton’s trial counsel, therefore, had a conflict of
interest regarding the assertion of this claim. 293 Because circuit public
defender’s offices are treated as law firms for purposes of the imputation
of conflicts of interest, every lawyer in the Lookout Mountain Office of
the Public Defender had a conflict of interest in claiming that trial
counsel, a member of that office, had rendered ineffective assistance. 294
Therefore, Shelton had been represented in connection with the amended
motion for new trial by conflicted counsel and was entitled to a new
hearing, with new and unconflicted counsel, regarding his claim that his
trial counsel had been ineffective. 295
D. Ineffective assistance and guilty pleas
The Georgia Supreme Court decided two cases relating to ineffective
assistance and guilty pleas.
In Collier v. State, 296 the court overruled a number of cases and
clarified the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel in the context
of a request for an out-of-time appeal. 297 The court held that defendants
are entitled to out-of-time appeals if they can show that their counsel’s
constitutionally ineffective performance deprived them of appeals as of
right that they otherwise would have pursued. 298 The court overruled
cases that required such defendants to specify the points they would raise
Shelton v. State, 350 Ga. App. 774, 774–75, 830 S.E.2d 335, 337–38 (2019).
Id. at 784, 830 S.E.2d at 343.
291 Id. at 785, 830 S.E.2d at 344.
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 Id. at 784–85, 830 S.E.2d at 344.
295 Id. at 785–86, 344–45.
296 307 Ga. 363, 834 S.E.2d 769 (2019).
297 Id. at 376–77, 834 S.E.2d 781.
298 Id. at 365, 834 S.E.2d at 773–74.
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on appeal and to demonstrate that they would have prevailed in any such
appeal. 299
The court also overruled a “peculiar line of cases” in which the court
seemed to have held that an appeal from a guilty plea was limited in
scope, to issues that could be “resolved by facts appearing in the
record.” 300 The court held that “[b]ecause prejudice is presumed, a
criminal defendant cannot be required to identify the meritorious issue
he would have raised (on the existing record or otherwise) in a
hypothetical appeal in order to establish that his counsel’s deficient
performance prejudiced him.” 301
The defendant in the case filed his motion for out-of-time appeal in
the trial court where he had pled guilty nine years before, a procedure
that Georgia law has long permitted. The district attorney urged the
court to require defendants to file petitions for habeas corpus instead of
motions for out-of-time appeals in the original trial court. In a habeas
case, the state would be able to rely upon statutory defenses of limitations
and prejudicial delay. 302 The supreme court declined to stop the timehonored practice of allowing motions for out-of-time appeals in the
original trial courts but did hold that the state could raise the defense of
prejudicial delay if the defendant chose to do so. 303 The court remanded
the case for further proceedings in the trial court consistent with its
opinion. 304
Douglas Burley pled guilty to murder in 1992 and did not appeal,
allegedly because his attorney erroneously advised him that he could not
appeal a conviction based upon a guilty plea. In 2019, Mr. Burley filed a
motion for an out-of-time appeal and alleged that his failure to appeal
was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. 305 The trial court
denied the motion without a hearing, but the supreme court, following its
earlier holding in Collier, 306 ordered the case remanded for a hearing. 307
IV. BAR ADMISSION
The Georgia Supreme Court decided two cases related to bar
admission during the Survey period.

Id. at 366–67, 834 S.E.2d at 774.
Id. at 367, 834 S.E.2d at 775.
301 Id. at 368–69, 834 S.E.2d at 776.
302 Id. at 369–70, 834 S.E.2d at 776–77.
303 Id. at 370, 834 S.E.2d at 777.
304 Id. at 376, 834 S.E.2d at 781.
305 Burley v. State, 308 Ga. 650, 650, 842 S.E.2d 851, 852 (2020).
306 Collier, 307 Ga. at 363, 834 S.E.2d at 769.
307 Burley, 308 Ga. at 652 ,842 S.E.2d at 853.
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The supreme court upheld the decision of the board to determine
character and fitness not to approve the fitness application of a lawyer
who had been disbarred in 2012. 308 The lawyer was disbarred as a result
of a grievance from a client who was contesting his obligation to pay child
support. The lawyer failed to appear for the hearing and effectively
withdrew from representing the client. Yet in both the response to the
notice of investigation and in her testimony before the special master, the
lawyer falsely claimed that she actually had attended the hearing. 309 The
supreme court disbarred her, noting that it had “little tolerance for
attorneys who make false statements during disciplinary
proceedings.” 310 Numerous other clients had filed grievances, and one of
the clients eventually recovered $3,500 from the State Bar client security
fund. 311
When the lawyer first sought reinstatement, she had not paid the
security fund the $3,500 that it had paid to her former client. The lawyer
said that she had not made the payment because her former client may
have committed “fraud” on the security fund. When the board to
determine character and fitness issued a tentative order denying her
application, the lawyer paid the $3,500. However, at the subsequent
formal hearing, the lawyer again claimed that her former client may have
defrauded the security fund and claimed that the charges of unethical
conduct against her were untrue. 312 The board voted to deny her
application, and the supreme court concurred, noting that the lawyer:
showed in the proceedings below the same type of dishonesty and
inability to take responsibility for her prior misdeeds that she
demonstrated in the disciplinary proceedings that led to her
disbarment in the first place. This [c]ourt does not countenance such
dishonesty and blame shifting in those who seek to practice law in the
state of Georgia. 313

Sandra M. Fuller surrendered her license in 2011 after she was found
guilty of nine felony counts of theft by conversion and sentenced under
the First Offender Act. She had done indigent defense work and kept the
fees rather than remitting them to the firm where she worked at the
time. 314

In re Davis, 307 Ga. 276, 276–77, 834 S.E.2d 93, 94 (2019).
Id. at 277–78, 834 S.E.2d at 94–95.
310 Id. at 278, 834 S.E.2d at 95.
311 Id.
312 Id. at 279, 834 S.E.2d at 95.
313 Id. at 280, 834 S.E.2d at 96.
314 In re Fuller, 307 Ga. 581, 581, 837 S.E.2d 297, 297 (2020).
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As a first step toward regaining her license, Ms. Fuller sought a
certificate of fitness to practice law from the fitness board and provided
evidence of her rehabilitation, including completion of her sentence,
volunteer and paid work for a ministry-based organization that helps
people build businesses, evidence of leadership and service awards from
other organizations, and letters of recommendation. 315 The fitness board
determined after an informal conference that Ms. Fuller had
demonstrated her rehabilitation by clear and convincing evidence, and
the supreme court agreed and approved her application for a certificate
of fitness. 316
V. DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL
In a dispute over control of an LLC, the majority owner sued the
minority owner and nominally sued the LLC itself in a derivative
capacity. 317 The attorney for the minority owner also entered an
appearance for the LLC and, on behalf of the LLC, filed an answer and
opposed the plaintiff’s motion to realign the parties to make the LLC a
plaintiff. The trial court granted the motion to realign the parties and
granted the plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify the lawyer who represented
the minority owner and who had represented the LLC before it was
realigned. 318 The court of appeals affirmed. 319 The court of appeals relied
on Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9(a) 320 and found that the
lawyer’s continued representation of the minority owner was the
representation of a client against a former client (the LLC) in the same
matter in which the lawyer had represented the former client. 321
The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the disqualification of a
husband’s attorney in a divorce case. 322 The attorney had represented the
husband for many years, but during the marriage the wife contacted the
attorney about a dispute with her former employer over payment of a
commission. The attorney agreed to look at the issue and give the wife
his opinion. The attorney asked for more information and learned the
commission structure under which the wife worked. The attorney gave
the wife advice about whether she could secretly record a conversation

Id. at 581–82, 837 S.E.2d at 297–98.
Id. at 582, 837 S.E.2d at 298.
317 Brooks v. Quinlan, 353 Ga. App. 573, 574, 839 S.E.2d 51, 53 (2020).
318 Id. at 575–76, 839 S.E.2d at 54.
319 Id. at 578, 839 S.E.2d at 56.
320 GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9(a) (2020).
321 Brooks, 353 Ga. App. at 577–78, 839 S.E.2d at 55.
322 Samnick v. Goodman, 354 Ga. App. 805, 805–06, 841 S.E.2d 468, 470 (2020).
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with her former employer and promised to write a letter for her, but he
never did so. 323
Although the wife never paid a fee or entered into an engagement
agreement, the trial court found that there was an implied
attorney-client relationship between the wife and the attorney. 324 The
court of appeals agreed. 325 Furthermore, the court of appeals agreed with
the trial court that the representation of the wife was substantially
related to the divorce case because an issue in the divorce would be the
wife’s earning potential, and her commission structure was relevant to
that issue. 326 Because the attorney had represented the wife in a
substantially related matter, the attorney was disqualified from
representing the husband in the divorce. 327
VI. JUDICIAL CONDUCT
The Georgia Supreme Court decided one case during the Survey
period regarding judicial conduct.
Marlina Hamilton killed her ex-husband because, according to her,
he was attacking her with his fists in her home, after many years of
having physically abused her. 328 She was tried and convicted of felony
murder and other counts, but the trial judge granted a new trial, in part
because her lawyer rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by not
seeking a pretrial determination that she was immune from criminal
prosecution because she acted in self-defense. 329 After appeals and a
remand to the trial court, the trial judge held a hearing and granted Ms.
Hamilton such immunity. 330
On appeal, the state raised numerous arguments, including the
argument that the trial judge should have recused himself because the
judge had disregarded the jury’s verdict by granting a new trial and had
with his detailed order (including references to the trial transcript and
the failure of trial counsel to seek immunity), given the appearance of
having a “personal agenda” about how the case should turn out. 331 The
supreme court rejected this argument, noting that it was not unusual for
the same judge to preside over a case after a new trial has been

Id. at 806–07, 841 S.E.2d at 470–71.
Id. at 809, 841 S.E.2d at 472.
325 Id. at 811–12, 841 S.E.2d at 473.
326 Id. at 813, 841 S.E.2d at 474–75.
327 Id. at 814, 841 S.E.2d at 475.
328 State v. Hamilton, 308 Ga. 116, 118, 839 S.E.2d 560, 564 (2020).
329 Id. at 118, 839 S.E.2d at 564.
330 Id. at 119, 839 S.E.2d at 565.
331 Id. at 130, 839 S.E.2d at 572.
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granted. 332 The supreme court characterized the state’s position that the
trial court’s grant of the earlier motion for new trial created an
“appearance of impropriety” on remand as “borderline-frivolous.” 333
VII.MALPRACTICE AND OTHER CIVIL CLAIMS
The court of appeals decided four cases involving malpractice or other
civil claims against lawyers during the Survey period.
Alexandra Myles hired Kenneth S. Nugent, P.C. to bring a claim
against the City of Smithville regarding a car accident. The law firm
assigned one of its attorneys, Christopher Warren, to handle the matter.
The city’s insurance adjuster made a settlement offer that Myles rejected.
During the meeting in which Myles rejected the offer, Warren came to
believe (perhaps incorrectly) that he had missed the statute of limitations
for bringing Myles’s claim. Warren adjourned the meeting and soon
accepted a slightly higher settlement offer, on behalf of Myles but without
her knowledge or permission. The check for the insurer’s payment of the
settlement amount was deposited into the Nugent law firm’s escrow
account after someone at the firm signed Myles’s name to it. 334
In her pleadings, Myles alleged repeatedly that the engagement
agreement she signed with the Nugent firm was “illegal.” 335 The Nugent
firm sought partial summary judgment regarding the legality of its
engagement agreement, but the trial court declined to grant summary
judgment because a decision on this issue would not have disposed of any
of the plaintiff’s claims. Lawyers for the Nugent firm in the trial court
could not identify any such claim, and the court of appeals declined to
consider arguments first raised on appeal that several of the plaintiff’s
claims would fail if the contract were deemed to be legal. 336
The court of appeals also reviewed the trial court’s grant of partial
summary judgment to the plaintiff that the Nugent firm had effectively
settled her case (according to Myles, without her knowledge or
permission) and that as a result her claims against the City of Smithville
had been released. 337 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court, noting
that the insurance company was entitled to rely on Warren’s apparent
authority to settle his client’s case. 338 Myles’s remedy under these

Id.
Id., 839 S.E.2d at 573.
334 Nugent v. Myles, 350 Ga. App. 442, 443–44, 829 S.E.2d 623, 625 (2019).
335 Id. at 444, 829 S.E.2d at 625.
336 Id. at 445, 829 S.E.2d at 626.
337 Id. at 446–47, 829 S.E.2d at 627.
338 Id. at 448–49, 829 S.E.2d at 628–29.
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circumstances was against the attorneys who “overstepped the bounds”
of their agency, not against the City. 339
The court of appeals affirmed a trial court’s granting of summary
judgment to a law firm that had been sued by a former client for legal
malpractice and for fraud. 340 The plaintiff had been injured and had a
potential tort claim against the Georgia Ports Authority. Because the
Ports Authority is a state entity, the tort claim could not proceed without
a timely and adequate ante litem notice. 341 The law firm sent a notice,
but the plaintiff hired a different law firm before a suit was filed. The law
firm then gave the plaintiff a disk with all of the law firm’s files on the
matter, but the plaintiff’s wife misplaced it. The plaintiff did not ask for
a replacement disk. The plaintiff gave his new law firm the documents
he had, which did not include the ante litem notice. When the new law
firm saw what it believed to be the entire file, and the absence of an ante
litem notice, the firm declined to proceed (without asking further about
the ante litem notice). By the time the plaintiff hired another attorney,
the statute of limitations had expired. 342
The plaintiff claimed first that the Eichholz firm committed
malpractice by sending a defective ante litem notice. 343 The court of
appeals held that the notice was legally sufficient. 344 The plaintiff also
claimed that the law firm was negligent in failing to provide him with a
copy of the ante litem notice and in failing to advise him that the notice
was important and that it should be provided to any new attorney the
plaintiff hired. 345 The court of appeals held that, as a matter of law, the
plaintiff could not show that any failures by the Eichholz firm were the
proximate cause of the loss of his claim. 346 The court held that the firm
could not have foreseen that the plaintiff’s wife would misplace the disk,
that the plaintiff would not request a replacement, and that the new
lawyer would not verify whether an ante litem notice had been sent. 347
These intervening events severed any causation between the actions of
the Eichholz firm and the plaintiff’s injuries.
The plaintiff also claimed that the Eichholz firm perpetrated a fraud
on him by its advertising. 348 Specifically, the plaintiff claimed first that
339 Id. at 447, 829 S.E.2d at 628 (quoting Clark v. Perino, 235 Ga. App. 444, 509 S.E.2d
707 (1998)).
340 Bush v. Eichholz, 352 Ga. App. 465, 466, 833 S.E.2d 280, 282 (2019).
341 Id.
342 Id. at 467, 833 S.E.2d at 282–83.
343 Id. at 467–68, 833 S.E.2d at 283.
344 Id. at 470, 833 S.E.2d at 284.
345Id. at 473, 833 S.E.2d at 287.
346 Id. at 471, 833 S.E.2d at 285–86.
347 Id. at 474, 833 S.E.2d at 287.
348 Id. at 475, 833 S.E.2d at 288.
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the firm falsely advertised that it had obtained three significant
verdicts. 349 The court of appeals rejected this part of the claim because
the firm was co-counsel in one of the cases and the plaintiff presented no
evidence to support his contention that the firm played no role in
obtaining the other two verdicts. 350 More broadly, the plaintiff alleged
that the firm falsely advertised itself as “the people’s lawyer” and “the
justice lawyer” when in fact it was a “settlement mill fueled by television
and billboard advertising.” 351 The court of appeals held that such
statements in advertising were statements of opinion, or puffing, and
that they could not be a basis for a fraud claim because they were not the
type of “empirically verifiable statement[s] that can be affirmatively
disproven[.]” 352 The court also noted that the plaintiff never took any
steps to ascertain the accuracy of the firm’s descriptions of itself and in
particular never asked how many cases the firm actually had taken to
trial. 353
The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial
court’s decisions in connection with a malpractice claim against Alston &
Bird. 354 Understanding the decision requires a detailed recitation of the
facts that led to the case.
Maury Hatcher retained Alston & Bird to form and represent Hatcher
Management Holdings, LLC (HMH), a holding company for the assets of
Maury’s family. The operating agreement drafted by Alston & Bird
provided that the members had the right to inspect the company’s books
and to know about distributions to other members through quarterly
statements. It did not list the percentages owned by each member,
although Maury was permitted by the agreement to have that
information. The members held an organizational meeting in March
2001, but Alston & Bird did not point out these aspects of the operating
agreement to the members at that time. 355
Between 2005 and the spring of 2008, Maury embezzled over a million
dollars from HMH. In the spring of 2008, Maury’s brother Jerry (a
member of HMH) expressed concerns about the lack of information about
HMH’s affairs. At Maury’s request, Alston & Bird responded by sending

Id.
Id.
351 Id. at 468, 476, 833 S.E.2d at 283, 288.
352 Id. at 476, 833 S.E.2d at 288.
353 Id. at 476–77, 833 S.E.2d at 289.
354 Alston & Bird LLP v. Hatcher Management Holdings LLC, 355 Ga. App. 525, 536,
843 S.E.2d 613, 622 (2020).
355 Id. at 526–27, 843 S.E.2d at 616.
349
350

204

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

Jerry a letter that described Maury’s broad authority to manage HMH
without responding to the members’ requests to see HMH’s records. 356
In June and then in July, Maury sent letters to Jerry. The first letter
asked Jerry to withdraw from HMH. 357 The second letter told Jerry that
Alston & Bird had “indicated” that Jerry was not entitled to know the
members’ ownership interests or income. 358
The family held a meeting on August 2, 2008. Maury’s brother Barry
complained about the lack of access to information about the income of
HMH’s members and suggested having his own accountant go over the
books. Maury responded that he would not necessarily respond to any
such effort. 359 Maury said that listing everyone’s ownership interest and
income was “not appropriate.” 360 At the meeting, Alston & Bird’s attorney
stated that members could have the ownership and income information
only if there was majority approval for it or for replacing Maury. This
statement was incorrect, because as noted the HMH operating
agreement required the manager to provide quarterly statements
showing the distributions to each member. 361
There was evidence that, if the other members had seen that
information in August, they could have taken steps to recoup much of
what Maury had embezzled by taking court action to apply the value of
Maury’s membership interest in HMH to the deficiencies. That became
impossible when Maury redeemed his shares before the other members
saw the books. 362
In the wake of the August meeting, Maury discussed with Alston &
Bird redeeming his shares in HMH. In October 2008, Maury redeemed
his shares for $397,000 more than they were worth. Neither Maury nor
Alston & Bird disclosed the redemption to other members of HMH until
Maury resigned from HMH on January 2, 2009, soon after which he
moved to Florida. 363 Later that month, the members appointed Jerry and
Barry to manage HMH, and they sought access to HMH’s records. Alston
& Bird sent them a cease-and-desist letter demanding that they stop
interfering in HMH’s interests, even though a junior attorney with the
firm warned that Alston & Bird had a conflict of interest between its
representation of Maury and its representation of HMH. The junior
attorney gave a similar warning as Alston & Bird worked on a second
Id. at 527, 843 S.E.2d at 616.
Id.
358 Id.
359 Id.
360 Id.
361 Id. at 527–28, 843 S.E.2d at 616–17.
362 Id. at 528, 843 S.E.2d at 617.
363 Id.
356
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cease and desist letter. In February 2009, Alston & Bird offered to
provide Jerry and Barry HMH’s records if they signed a release. They
refused. 364
In August 2009, HMH’s accountant was able to determine, even
without all of the documents, that Maury had misappropriated $1.49
million from HMH. In December 2009, HMH sued Maury for this sum
and accrued interest and obtained a judgment of over $4 million. HMH
has been unable to collect the judgment. 365
HMH sued Alston & Bird to recover its losses. The jury found that
Alston & Bird had committed legal malpractice and breached its
fiduciary duties. It found that HMH had been damaged in the amount of
$697,614 and awarded prejudgment interest of $341,831 and attorney’s
fees and costs of $1,096,561.48. The jury apportioned fault for HMH’s
damages at 8% to HMH itself, 60% to Maury, and 32% to Alston & Bird.
The trial court apportioned everything according to these percentages
and entered final judgment against Alston & Bird for 32% of the sum of
the compensatory damages, the prejudgment interest, and the attorney’s
fees and costs. 366
The court of appeals had to decide several issues on the appeal. 367
These issues were proximate cause, apportionment of damages,
prejudgment interest, and apportionment of attorney’s fees. 368
The court of appeals rejected Alston & Bird’s argument that it was
entitled to a directed verdict because the breaches of Alston & Bird’s
duties to HMH were not the proximate cause of HMH’s injuries. 369 The
court noted that, although Maury had been embezzling money from HMH
since 2005, the other members of HMH could have recouped some of
those funds by applying Maury’s membership interest against what he
stole. 370 The members were deprived of the opportunity to do so because
Alston & Bird incorrectly advised them at the August 2008 meeting of
their rights to see the records that would have revealed the
embezzlement and because the firm failed to disclose Maury’s October
2008 redemption of his membership interest. 371
The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s reduction of the damage
award by the percentage of Maury’s fault. 372 The court held that the

Id.
Id.
366 Id. at 528–29, 843 S.E.2d at 617.
367 Id., 843 S.E.2d at 617.
368 Id. at 525, 843 S.E.2d at 613.
369 Id. at 530, 843 S.E.2d at 618.
370 Id.
371 Id.
372 Id. at 534–35, 843 S.E.2d at 621.
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applicable portion of the apportionment statute only allowed reduction of
the damages by the percentage of fault assigned to the plaintiff, HMH,
and not to Maury, a non-party. 373 The relevant statutory language is:
(a) Where an action is brought against one or more persons for injury
to person or property and the plaintiff is to some degree responsible for
the injury or damages claimed, the trier of fact, in its determination of
the total amount of damages to be awarded, if any, shall determine the
percentage of fault of the plaintiff and the judge shall reduce the
amount of damages otherwise awarded to the plaintiff in proportion to
his or her percentage of fault. 374

Because HMH brought the case only against one party, the court
reasoned, this section directs the trial court to reduce the damages only
according to the percentage of fault attributed to the plaintiff. 375
The court of appeals agreed with Alston & Bird, however, with respect
to prejudgment interest. 376 HMH sought prejudgment interest under
O.C.G.A. § 13-6-13, 377 which allows for the recovery of prejudgment
interest in actions involving breaches of duty that arise from a specific
contract. 378 Because HMH did not include a breach of contract action in
its suit and did not point to a specific contract from which the duties that
Alston & Bird violated arose, the court of appeals held that HMH was not
entitled to recovery of prejudgment interest. 379
HMH sought to recover attorney’s fees and costs under O.C.G.A. §
13-6-11. 380 The jury found that Alston & Bird had “acted in bad faith”
and awarded just under $1.1 million in fees and costs. 381 The trial court
apportioned the award of fees and costs to track the apportionment of
compensatory damages, 382 but the court of appeals reversed this part of
the judgment. 383 Because HMH was the prevailing party in the litigation
Id. at 534, 843 S.E.2d at 620–21.
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 (2020) (alterations added by court).
375 Alston & Bird, 355 Ga. App. at 534, 843 S.E.2d at 620.
376 Id. at 531, 843 S.E.2d at 618.
377 “In all cases where an amount ascertained would be the damages at the time of the
breach, it may be increased by the addition of legal interest from that time until the
recovery.” O.C.G.A. § 13-6-13 (2020).
378 Alston & Bird, 355 Ga. App. at 532, 843 S.E.2d at 619.
379 Id.
380 Id. at 535, 843 S.E.2d at 621. “The expenses of litigation generally shall not be allowed
as a part of the damages; but where the plaintiff has specially pleaded and has made prayer
therefor and where the defendant has acted in bad faith, has been stubbornly litigious, or
has caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense, the jury may allow them.”
O.C.G.A. §13-6-11 (2020).
381 Id.
382 Id.
383 Id.
373
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and there was no evidence that anyone other than Alston & Bird had
acted in bad faith, the court of appeals held that Alston & Bird should be
held liable for the entire amount of the attorney’s fees and costs. 384
In another case, the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in
part a grant of summary judgment to attorneys who represented the wife
in a multi-million dollar divorce case that settled. 385 The court of appeals
reversed the grant of summary judgment on a claim that the wife’s
attorneys did not include, as part of the settlement, recoupment by the
wife of $166,567.70 that she was ordered to pay for the husband’s
attorney’s fees in the midst of the case. 386 The trial court had ordered that
interim payment with the proviso that it would be credited against the
husband’s ultimate share of the marital estate and also had ordered the
attorneys to enter into a stipulation that this would be done. 387 It was
not, and the court of appeals held that summary judgment on this point
had to be reversed because there was evidence that the wife’s lawyers
had not exercised reasonable care on this point and that the wife would
have received a better deal in the settlement in the divorce if they had
done so. 388
Otherwise, the court of appeals affirmed summary judgment for the
attorneys. 389 The wife alleged that the lawyers failed to advise her of the
significant tax consequences of the settlement, 390 but the court of appeals
held that she severed any causation between their alleged negligence and
her damages by making an “independent, well-informed and deliberate
decision to accept the assets with the attendant tax consequences” that
others had explained to her. 391 She also claimed that she received an
inequitable share of the marital assets, 392 but the court of appeals held
that she could not show that she would have received a better deal but
for the lawyers’ alleged errors. 393 The court of appeals rejected a claim
that there were any fact issues with respect to the failure of her lawyers
to secure payment of her attorney’s fees by the husband, given that such
an award in any event would have been discretionary for the trial
judge. 394 Finally, the court of appeals affirmed summary judgment for

Id.
Rollins v. Smith, 353 Ga. App. 209, 209, 836 S.E.2d 585, 587 (2019).
386 Id. at 214, 836 S.E.2d at 590.
387 Id. at 213, 836 S.E.2d at 589–90.
388 Id. at 214, 836 S.E.2d at 590.
389 Id. at 211, 836 S.E.2d at 588.
390 Id. at 215, 836 S.E.2d at 591.
391 Id. at 219, 836 S.E.2d at 593.
392 Id., 836 S.E.2d at 593.
393 Id., 836 S.E.2d at 594.
394 Id. at 219–20, 836 S.E.2d at 594.
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the defendants with respect to punitive damages because the only
remaining count, the lawyers’ failure to enter into the stipulation to
credit the interim attorney’s fees for the husband to the husband’s
ultimate share of the marital estate, was at most the result of
negligence. 395
VIII.PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
In a closing argument in a murder trial, an experienced prosecutor
purported to tell the jury what a particular witness would have said if
she had been called to testify. The defense objected to the argument as
being outside the evidence and successfully moved for a mistrial. 396 The
defendant then argued that retrial should be barred by double jeopardy
because the prosecutor intentionally committed misconduct to goad the
defense into obtaining a mistrial. 397 The trial court agreed with the
defendant, 398 and the supreme court affirmed, holding that it was proper
for the trial court to infer the prosecutor’s intent from the facts that the
prosecutor was experienced and that the evidence against the defendant
was not overwhelming. 399
IX. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
In a legal malpractice case, the plaintiffs sued one firm that
represented them in connection with the underlying matter but did not
sue another firm that also represented them in connection with that
same matter. 400 The defendants sought discovery of documents from the
firm that had not been sued, and the plaintiffs sought to prevent that
discovery on the basis of the attorney-client privilege. 401 The trial court
held that the privilege had been waived as to communications with all of
the plaintiffs’ attorneys in connection with the underlying matter,
including those attorneys who were not defendants. 402 The court of
appeals reversed and held that the waiver of the privilege only extends
to communications with the defendants. 403 The supreme court reversed
and held that the waiver extends to communications with all the lawyers

Id. at 220, 836 S.E.2d at 594.
State v. Jackson, 306 Ga. 626, 628, 831 S.E.2d 798, 800 (2019).
397 Id. at 628, 831 S.E.2d at 800–01.
398 Id.
399 Id. at 633, 831 S.E.2d at 803–04.
400 Hill, Kertscher & Wharton, LLP v. Moody, 308 Ga. 74, 74, 839 S.E.2d 535, 536 (2020).
401 Id. at 75–76, 839 S.E.2d at 537–38.
402 Id. at 76, 839 S.E.2d at 538.
403 Id. at 77, 839 S.E.2d at 538.
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who represented the plaintiffs in connection with the underlying
matters. 404
X. CONTEMPT
A trial court held two defense lawyers in direct contempt in a criminal
case and, after giving them an opportunity to be heard, summarily fined
them each $175. The alleged contempt related to the court’s order to
sequester witnesses. 405 The lawyers had placed two defense witnesses in
a conference room that opened into the courtroom, and the door to that
room had been open during the testimony of other witnesses. 406 The
defense witnesses told the judge that they could hear some of what was
going on in the courtroom but one stated, “I wasn’t paying attention” and
the other said, “it wasn’t clear.” 407
The court of appeals reversed. 408 The majority held first that the
alleged conduct was not direct contempt because it did not occur in open
court and therefore was not subject to summary adjudication. 409
Whatever instructions the lawyers gave to the witnesses were not given
in open court, and therefore at most the lawyers could have been guilty
of indirect contempt. For such charges, the lawyers were entitled to be
advised of the charges, to have a reasonable opportunity to respond to
them, and to have the assistance of counsel. 410
The majority also held that the evidence did not establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that the attorneys had willfully violated the court’s
order to sequester the witnesses. 411 There was insufficient evidence that
the witnesses could hear the testimony from the conference room, and
there was no evidence that the attorneys assisted or were otherwise
responsible even if the witnesses were able to do so. 412
Judge McMillian dissented on the grounds that the allegations
against the attorneys did constitute a direct contempt and that there was
sufficient evidence to sustain the trial court’s finding that the attorneys
had willfully violated the court’s order of sequestration. 413

Id. at 79, 839 S.E.2d at 539.
In re Adams, 354 Ga. App. 484, 485, 841 S.E.2d 143, 145 (2020).
406 Id. at 484, 841 S.E.2d at 145.
407 Id. at 485, 841 S.E.2d at 145.
408 Id. at 484, 841 S.E.2d at 144.
409 Id. at 485–86, 841 S.E.2d at 145.
410 Id. at 486–87, 841 S.E.2d at 146.
411 Id. at 488, 841 S.E.2d at 147.
412 Id. at 488–89, 841 S.E.2d at 147.
413 Id. at 489, 841 S.E.2d at 148 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
404
405

210

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

XI. MISCELLANEOUS CASES
The Georgia Supreme Court decided one miscellaneous legal ethics
case during the Survey period, while the court of appeals decided one.
A plaintiff asserted claims for abusive litigation against his former
employer, the employer’s law firm, and two individual lawyers in that
firm relating to their conduct in an underlying breach of contract case. 414
The trial court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted because the plaintiff had not pled special damages,
and the court also ruled that punitive damages are not available in
abusive litigation cases. 415 The court of appeals reversed the trial court
with respect to the need to plead special damages but affirmed the
holding that punitive damages are not available in an abusive litigation
case. 416
By writ of certiorari, the plaintiff sought review of the court of appeals
ruling with respect to punitive damages. 417 The supreme court granted
the writ and unanimously held that the abusive litigation statute’s
language that permits recovery of “all damages allowed by law as proved
by the evidence” includes punitive damages. 418 In so doing, the court
overruled two prior cases and disapproved language in a third case. 419
In the other case, a group of investors sued a lawyer and his client
(among others) and claimed that the lawyer had helped the client
perpetrate a fraud on the investors. 420 The lawyer allegedly furthered the
fraudulent scheme by providing the investors with documents that
purported to show that the investments were legitimate. 421 The
complaint alleged in particular that the lawyer “aided and abetted” the
client’s fraud. 422
The lawyer sought dismissal of the case on the basis that Georgia law
does not recognize the tort of aiding and abetting fraud. 423 The trial court
denied the motion. 424 The court of appeals affirmed and held that,
although there is no tort in Georgia for “aiding and abetting” fraud, one
who knowingly participates in a fraud may be held liable for it. 425 Here,
Coen v. Aptean, Inc., 307 Ga. 826, 827, 838 S.E.2d 860, 861 (2020).
Id. at 828, 838 S.E.2d at 862.
416 Id.
417 Id. at 828–29, 838 S.E.2d at 862.
418 Id. at 830, 838 S.E.2d at 863.
419 Id. at 840, 838 S.E.2d at 870.
420 Siavage v. Gandy, 350 Ga. App. 562, 562, 829 S.E.2d 787, 788 (2019).
421 Id. at 562–63, 829 S.E.2d at 788.
422 Id. at 562, 829 S.E.2d at 788.
423 Id. at 563, 829 S.E.2d at 788.
424 Id., 829 S.E.2d at 789.
425 Id. at 566, 829 S.E.2d at 790.
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the court of appeals concluded, the investors had sufficiently alleged that
the lawyer was a knowing participant in the fraud by drafting documents
that created the false impression that the investments were
legitimate. 426
XII.FORMAL ADVISORY OPINIONS 427
A.

State Bar of Georgia Formal Advisory Opinion Board

The State Bar of Georgia Formal Advisory Opinion Board (FAOB)
considers requests for formal advisory opinions that interpret the
Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. 428 If the FAOB accepts a request,
it drafts an opinion and publishes it for comment in an official state bar
publication or the State Bar website. 429 The FAOB then reviews any
comments and decides whether to adopt the opinion. 430 Some, but not all,
of the FAOB’s opinions are reviewed by the Georgia Supreme Court. 431
During the Survey year, the FAOB received two requests for formal
advisory opinions. Request 19-1 asked whether it is a violation of Georgia
Rules of Professional Conduct for a Georgia lawyer to purchase Google
Ad Words selecting the name of a competing attorney such that a Google
search for the competing attorney would cause the lawyer’s name to
appear in the search results before the name of the competing
attorney. 432 As of the end of the Survey year, this request was still
pending before the Board. 433
Request 19-R2 asked several questions about the propriety under the
Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct of an attorney advising, assisting,
or accepting as a fee an ownership interest in a client that cultivates,
processes, manufactures, distributes, or sells hemp or a cannabis
plant. 434 Certain activities related to hemp and cannabis are legal under
Georgia law but illegal under federal law, and Rule 1.2(d) 435 forbids an

Id., 829 S.E.2d at 790.
The Author is a member of the State Bar of Georgia Formal Advisory Opinion Board.
This discussion is the Author’s alone and does not reflect any opinion or policy of the Board
or any of its members. The Author thanks John Shiptenko, Senior Assistant General
Counsel to the State Bar of Georgia and staff liaison to the Formal Advisory Opinion Board,
for his assistance with this section.
428 GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-403(a) (2020).
429 GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-403(c) (2020).
430 Id.
431 GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-403(d)–(e) (2020).
432 Formal Advisory Opinion Board Meeting Agenda October 24, 2019 at 2.
433 Formal Advisory Opinion Board Meeting Minutes, Thursday, January 23, 2020 at 2.
434 Formal Advisory Opinion Board Meeting Agenda October 24, 2019 at 3.
435 GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (2020).
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attorney from advising or assisting clients in the commission of crimes. 436
The Board tabled this request because the State Bar disciplinary Rules
and procedures committee had proposed an amendment to Rule 1.2(d) to
deal with these issues. 437 As of the end of the Survey period, that
proposed amendment had not been acted upon by the supreme court.
During the same time period, the FAOB acted upon two matters that
related to earlier requests or opinions. Request 18-R1 concerned conflicts
of interest in the context of an insurance company that elects to defend a
personal injury case in the name of a tortfeasor when the plaintiff has
his uninsured/under-insured motorist coverage with the insurance
company. 438 The FAOB declined this request. 439 The FAOB voted to
redraft Formal Advisory Opinion 94-3 relating to contacts with former
employees of a represented party. 440 At the close of the Survey period, the
new opinion had not been approved by the board, and this matter
remained pending.
B.

American Bar Association Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility

The formal opinions of the Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association do not
directly bind Georgia lawyers or courts. However, Georgia courts
frequently look to ABA formal opinions for guidance. 441 It is worth noting,
Formal Advisory Opinion Board Meeting Agenda October 24, 2019 at 2–3.
Id.
438 Id. at 1.
439 Formal Advisory Opinion Board Meeting Minutes, Thursday, January 23, 2020 at 1–
436
437
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Formal Advisory Opinion Board Meeting Minutes, Thursday, October 24, 2019 at 2.
See, e.g., In re Woodham, 296 Ga. 618, 621–22, 769 S.E.2d 353, 356–57 (2015)
(discussing and following ABA Formal Op. 06-443 (2006) regarding the propriety of contacts
between a lawyer and the in-house counsel for an opposing party who is represented by
outside counsel); Outdoor Advert. Ass’n of Georgia, Inc. v. Garden Club of Georgia, Inc., 272
Ga. 146, 148–49, 527 S.E.2d 856, 860 (2000) (using ABA Formal Op. 342 for guidance about
conflicts of interest for former government lawyers); Henderson v. HSI Fin. Servs., Inc., 266
Ga. 844, 845–46, 471 S.E.2d 885, 887 (1996) (citing and following ABA Formal Op. 303
regarding lawyers practicing in corporate form); Jones v. Jones, 258 Ga. 353, 355, 369
S.E.2d 478, 479 (1988) (citing and following ABA Formal Op. 340 regarding disqualification
when lawyers who are married to each other appear on opposite sides of a case); Frazier v.
State, 257 Ga. 690, 694, 362 S.E.2d 351, 357 (1987) (discussing and following ABA Formal
Op. 342 regarding imputation of conflicts of interest); Sanifill of Georgia, Inc. v. Roberts,
232 Ga. App. 510, 511, 502 S.E.2d 343, 344 (1998) (discussing and following ABA Formal
Op. 91-359 with respect to the no-contact rule and contacts with a former employee of a
represented corporation). But see Thompson v. State, 254 Ga. 393, 397, n.6, 330 S.E.2d 348,
351–52, n.6 (1985) (citing but not following ethics opinions, including ABA opinions,
regarding disqualification of part-time prosecutors, for “pragmatic” reasons); Summerville
v. Innovative Images, LLC, 349 Ga. App. 592, 596, 826 S.E.2d 391, 396 (2019) (declining to
440
441
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therefore, the ABA formal opinions that were issued during the Survey
year.
1.
Formal Opinion 487: Fee Division with Client’s Prior
Counsel 442
Suppose a client enters into a contingent fee contract with a lawyer
but then fires that lawyer without cause and hires successor counsel, also
under a contingent fee arrangement. The first lawyer may have a claim
against the client under quantum meruit for the value of the services
rendered before termination. 443 Formal opinion 487 provides guidance for
successor counsel in such situations. The primary points are these.
First, the successor counsel must advise the client in writing of the
first lawyer’s possible claim for a portion of the successor counsel’s
contingent fee in the event of a recovery. 444 This obligation flows from
both model Rule 1.5(b) 445 (lawyer’s duty to communicate the basis or rate
of fees) and 1.5(c) 446 (duty to obtain client written consent to a contingent
fee and to state the method by which the fee is to be determined). 447
Second, the opinion rejects authorities that apply the terms of Rule
1.5(e) 448 on fee sharing to the successor counsel scenario, because that
Rule is about arrangements among lawyers who simultaneously
represent a client and does not apply to sequential representation. 449
Third, when the matter is concluded, successor counsel may not share
the fee with the original counsel without client consent. 450 Finally, as
long as there is a disagreement about the first lawyer’s share of the fee,
the successor counsel must hold the amount claimed by the first lawyer
in trust. 451

use ABA Formal Op. 02-425 to support a conclusion that a law firm’s arbitration clause was
unconscionable, noting that the Georgia Supreme Court had not addressed whether that
opinion will be adopted as the proper interpretation of Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct
1.4(b)).
442 ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 487 (2019).
443 Id. at 1.
444 Id. at 2–3.
445 GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(b) (2020).
446 GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(c) (2020).
447 ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 487 at 2.
448 GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(e) (2020).
449 ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 487 at 4–5.
450 Id. at 5.
451 Id.
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2.
Formal Opinion 488: Judges’ Social or Close Personal
Relationships with Lawyers or Parties as Grounds for
Disqualification or Disclosure 452
Under Rule 2.11 of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 453 judges
must disqualify themselves in certain specific circumstances and
otherwise when their impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 454
Formal opinion 488 offers guidance for judges with respect to social
relationships with lawyers and parties that do not automatically require
disqualification. 455
The committee divided social relationships into three categories:
acquaintances, friendships, and close personal friendships. 456 An
acquaintance is someone with whom the judge has social interactions
that are coincidental and relatively superficial, such as membership in
the same place of worship, country club, gym, or professional
association. 457 A judge and an acquaintance do not seek each other’s
company but are cordial when they do interact. 458 Opinion 488 states that
a judge’s relationship as an acquaintance with a lawyer or party is not a
basis for disqualification because the judge’s impartiality could not be
reasonably questioned on the basis of such a relationship. 459 The judge
may but need not disclose to all counsel and parties that the judge has
such a relationship with an attorney or a party in a case. 460
A friendship with a party or lawyer exists if there is “a degree of
affinity greater than being acquainted with a person; indeed, the term
connotes some degree of mutual affection.” 461 Because some friendships
are closer than others, some will require a judge’s disqualification and
others will not. 462 It is a matter of degree, to be assessed on a case-bycase basis. 463 Even if the judge does not believe that the judge’s
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, the judge should disclose to
the parties and counsel any facts about the friendship that the parties
and counsel might consider relevant to a possible motion for
disqualification. 464 If a party objects to the judge’s participation in the
ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 488 (2019).
MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.11 (2020).
454 ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof. Resp., Formal Op. 488 at 1.
455 Id. at 3.
456 Id. at 2.
457 Id. at 4.
458 Id.
459 Id.
460 Id.
461 Id.
462 Id. at 5–6.
463 Id. at 6.
464 Id.
452
453
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matter, the judge has discretion to decide whether to recuse and should
explain the decision on the record. 465
A judge has a close personal relationship with a party or lawyer if the
relationship “goes beyond or is different from common concepts of
friendship.” 466 For example, a judge may be romantically involved with a
party or a lawyer, or the judge may desire or be actively pursuing such a
relationship. 467 In those circumstances, the judge’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned, and the judge is disqualified. 468 With respect
to other close personal relationships, such as the judge being the
godparent to a child of an attorney or a party, the judge must exercise
discretion. 469 Even if the judge does not believe the close personal
relationship is a reasonable basis to question the judge’s impartiality, the
judge must disclose enough facts about the relationship to allow the
parties and counsel to decide whether to seek the judge’s
disqualification. 470
Formal opinion 488 closes by noting that any disqualification that
would result from a friendship or close personal relationship between the
judge and a lawyer or party may be waived if all lawyers and parties
agree to do so. 471
3.
Formal Opinion 489: Obligations Related to Notice When
Lawyers Change Firms 472
Formal opinion 489 provides detailed guidance to lawyers and law
firms about their ethical responsibilities when a lawyer leaves a firm. 473
It will be easiest to summarize the most important guidance in the
context of a hypothetical Departing Lawyer who is leaving a Law Firm
and wants to continue to represent a Client at the Departing Lawyer’s
new firm.
The Client has the right to decide who will represent it. 474 The
Departing Lawyer must inform the Client of the imminent departure and
may do so without first telling the Law Firm, as long as the Departing
Lawyer informs the Law Firm contemporaneously. 475 The Departing

Id.
Id.
467 Id.
468 Id.
469 Id.
470 Id.
471 Id. at 7.
472 ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 489 (2019).
473 Id. at 1.
474 Id. at 3.
475 Id.
465
466

216

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

Lawyer and the Law Firm may not make false or misleading statements
to the Client, such as false disparaging statements about each other in
an attempt to persuade the Client. 476 If the Client decides to stay with
the Law Firm (and the Law Firm can provide competent representation
to the Client without the Departing Lawyer), then the Departing Lawyer
must take all reasonable steps to protect the Client’s interests, including
updating files and briefing the lawyers at the Law Firm who are going to
take over the representation. 477 If the Client chooses to have the
Departing Lawyer continue to represent it, the Law Firm may not deny
the Departing Lawyer access to the resources necessary to continue to
represent the Client during any period of transition before the Departing
Lawyer leaves the Law Firm. 478
The Law Firm may require a reasonable period of advance notice for
the Departing Lawyer’s departure from the law firm in order to provide
sufficient time for a smooth transition, regardless of whom the Client
chooses. 479 However, notice periods and financial consequences of
departure may not be set up or enforced in such a way that they interfere
with the Client’s choice of counsel or are used to coerce or punish the
Departing Lawyer. 480 There is a difference between a reasonable policy
to protect the Client during a transition and a policy that imposes a
financial penalty or disincentive on a Departing Lawyer who wishes to
compete with the Law Firm. 481 The latter type of provision is
unenforceable as an indirect restriction on the lawyer’s right to
practice. 482
4.
Formal Opinion 490: Ethical Obligations of Judges in
Collecting Legal Financial Obligations and Other Debts 483
The Model Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to comply with
the law (Rule 1.1 484); to promote public confidence in the independence,
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary (Rule 1.2 485); to uphold the law
and perform judicial duties fairly and impartially (Rule 2.2 486); and to

Id.
Id. at 4.
478 Id. at 6.
479 Id. at 5.
480 Id.
481 Id. at 5.
482 Id. at 6.
483 ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 490 (2020).
484 MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 1.1 (2020).
485 MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 1.2 (2020).
486 MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.2 (2020).
476
477
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accord every person the right to be heard according to law (Rule 2.6 487). 488
Formal opinion 490 explores these duties in the context of judges using
incarceration as punishment for failure to fulfill a financial obligation
such as a court fine or civil debt or using the threat of incarceration as
an inducement to make such payments. 489 The opinion concludes that
judges must make meaningful inquiries into the litigants’ ability to pay
such amounts before resorting to incarceration. 490 A “[f]ailure to adopt
and consistently follow ‘carefully prescribed procedures’ in proceedings
that could result in incarceration for failure to pay strikes at the very
roots of the fair and impartial administration of justice and poses a direct
threat to public faith in the legitimacy of the judicial process.” 491 The
opinion includes some guidance on best practices for making sure that an
appropriate inquiry into ability to pay is made. 492
5.
Formal Opinion 491: Obligations Under Rule 1.2(d) to
Avoid Counseling or Assisting in a Crime or Fraud in NonLitigation Settings 493
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(d) 494 provides that a lawyer
must not counsel a client to engage in, or assist a client with, conduct
that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. 495 Because of concerns
about lawyer assistance with money-laundering and financing terrorism,
the ABA standing committee issued formal opinion 491 to provide
guidance to lawyers about when they must seek more information before
helping clients. 496
“Knowledge” in the Model Rules is defined to mean actual knowledge,
but such knowledge can be inferred from circumstances. 497 The opinion
deals with transactions in which the client does not reveal any criminal
or fraudulent intent. 498 It addresses the question of when the lawyer
must make inquiries in order to be sure not to be rendering improper
counseling or assistance. 499 If the circumstances are such that there is a
“high probability” that the client is seeking to use the lawyer’s services
MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.6 (2020).
ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 490 at 5.
489 Id. at 1.
490 Id. at 10.
491 Id. at 7, (quoting In re Benoit, 487 A.2d 1158, 1165 (Me. 1985)).
492 Id. at 10.
493 ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 491 (2020).
494 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM BAR ASS’N 2020).
495 ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 491 at 1.
496 Id. at 1–2.
497 Id. at 1.
498 Id. at 2.
499 Id.
487
488
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for criminal or fraudulent activity, the lawyer must inquire further. 500 In
the absence of such an inquiry, the lawyer will be deemed to be acting
with willful blindness or conscious disregard of known facts, in which
case the lawyer’s knowledge will be inferred from the circumstances and
the lawyer will be in violation of Rule 1.2(d). 501
Formal opinion 491 also notes that a duty to make further inquiries
into the legality of a transaction can arise as part of the lawyer’s duties
of competence, diligence, communication, and honesty. 502 If the client
refuses to provide sufficient information for the lawyer to assess the
legality of the transaction, the lawyer ordinarily must withdraw from or
decline the representation. 503
XIII. AMENDMENTS TO THE GEORGIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
During the Survey period, the Georgia Supreme Court amended the
Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct in several significant respects. 504
A common issue for lawyers is to try to sort out their obligations to
prospective clients. Although the ABA model Rules of Professional
Conduct contain detailed guidance in Rule 1.18, 505 as of the close of the
Survey period Georgia had not adopted such a Rule (although a motion
from the state bar of Georgia giving the court the opportunity to do so
was pending). 506 Comment 4A to Rule 1.6 507 on confidentiality states:
Information gained in the professional relationship includes
information gained from a person (prospective client) who discusses
the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a
matter. Even when no client-lawyer relationship ensues, the
restrictions and exceptions of these Rules as to use or revelation of the
information apply, e.g. Rules 1.9 and 1.10. 508

To provide additional guidance, at least until Georgia adopts a version
of Rule 1.18, the supreme court approved adding “prospective client” to

Id.
Id.
502 Id. at 7.
503 Id. at 9–10.
504 The Author thanks Bill NeSmith, Deputy General Counsel to the State Bar of
Georgia, for his assistance with this section.
505 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.18 (AM BAR ASS’N 2020).
506 In re State Bar of Georgia Rules and Regulations for its Organization and
Government, Motion to Amend 2020-1 at 46-48 (on file with the author).
507 GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 4A (2020).
508 Id.
500
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Rule 1.0 509 as a defined term. 510 A “prospective client” is “a person who
consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client–lawyer
relationship with respect to a matter.” 511
The court made two changes in light of developments in the ways that
clients and lawyers communicate with each other. The definition of
“writing” or “written” in Rule 1.0 was changed to delete a specific
reference to email and replace it with the more general term “electronic
communication.” 512 Comment four to Rule 1.4 on communication no
longer instructs that lawyers should promptly return or acknowledge
client telephone calls but rather provides that lawyers “should promptly
respond to or acknowledge client communications.” 513
The court added two comments to Rule 5.3, which sets forth a lawyer’s
responsibilities with respect to nonlawyer assistants. Both of the new
comments are addressed to the use of nonlawyer assistants outside the
lawyer’s firm. New comment four provides that a lawyer may use such
assistance but “must take reasonable efforts to ensure that the assistance
is provided in a manner that is compatible with the lawyer’s professional
obligations.” 514 The comment then lists circumstances that are relevant
to the extent of this obligation. 515 New comment five recognizes that
sometimes clients direct the lawyer to use a particular nonlawyer outside
the lawyer’s firm and that the lawyer ordinarily should agree with the
client about the division of responsibility between the lawyer and the
client for monitoring the provider of the assistance. 516
The State Bar asked the court to approve a new exception to the
general Rule that lawyer’s may not share legal fees. The Bar’s proposed
amendment provided that “a lawyer may share court-awarded legal fees
with a nonprofit organization that employed, retained, or recommended
employment of the lawyer in the matter.” 517 The supreme court approved
the request with one change. Rule 5.4(a)(4) 518 now reads, “a lawyer shall
share court-awarded legal fees with a nonprofit organization that
employed, retained, or recommended employment of the lawyer in the
matter.” 519
GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.0 (2020).
Order of the Supreme Court of Georgia at 5 (November 18, 2019).
511 Id.
512 Id. at 6.
513 Id. at 7.
514 Id. at 8.
515 Id.
516 Id. at 8–9.
517 In re State Bar of Georgia Rules and Regulations for its Organization and
Government, Motion to Amend 2019-4 at 23.
518 GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(a)(4) (2020).
519 Id.
509
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The court made one change to the advertising Rules. Rule 7.1(a) 520
had provided that “[a] lawyer may advertise through all forms of public
media and through written communication not involving personal
contact so long as the communication is not false, fraudulent, deceptive
or misleading.” 521 The court simplified the statement to: “A lawyer shall
not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the
lawyer’s services.” 522
On a related note, the court amended Rule 7.5 523 on firm names and
letterhead. 524 The state bar disciplinary Rules and procedures committee
was considering amendments to this Rule, but the executive committee
of the bar voted to bypass the usual procedures and ask the court to
remove from the Rule some specific requirements with respect to trade
names. 525 One requirement was that the trade name had to include the
name of at least one of the lawyers practicing under that name or the
name of a deceased or retired partner in the firm. 526 The other was that
the firm name could not “imply a connection with a government entity,
with a public or charitable legal services organization or any other
organization, association or institution or entity, unless there is, in fact,
a connection.” 527 Instead, the Rule now states with respect to trade
names that a lawyer “shall not use a . . . trade name . . . that is false or
misleading.” 528
XIV. CONCLUSION
This Article surveys recent developments in Georgia legal ethics
through May 31, 2020. For updates on developments after that date, you
may visit the website of the Mercer Center for Legal Ethics and
Professionalism. 529

GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1(a) (2020).
In re State Bar of Georgia Rules and Regulations for its Organization and
Government, Motion to Amend 2019-4 at 28.
522 Order of the Supreme Court of Georgia at 12 (November 18, 2019).
523 GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.5 (2020).
524 Order of the Supreme Court of Georgia at 5 (February 6, 2020).
525 In re State Bar of Georgia Rules and Regulations for its Organization and
Government, Motion to Amend 2020-2 at 1–2.
526 Order of the Supreme Court of Georgia at 3 (February 6, 2020).
527 Id. at 4.
528 Id. at 1.
529 As a service to the Georgia bench and bar, the Mercer Center for Legal Ethics and
Professionalism provides monthly updates and other resources on recent developments in
Georgia legal ethics. Visit http://law.mercer.edu/academics/centers/clep/updates-legalethics/.
520
521

